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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
l. The Problem o.f the Thesis · 
The presence o.f evil, both moral and physical, in the universe is 
an obvious fact.. An explanation or understanding of the reason for this 
!fact is not so obvious. Numerous attempts have been made through the 
ages to reconcile evil with the order of the universe. This has often 
'taken the form of trying to explain the relation of God to evil as we 
know it. How are the two related? Or is there no relation, no point 
''of contact? 
I 
This thesis takes up a somewhat recent, and unique, solution to 
! 
:the problem. It is a theory which combines the concept of emergent 
, . I 
!evolution w.J,th a concept of a limited God; this theory aims to explain 
ievil in a consistent and satisfactory way. William. James, Hastings 
Rashdall and Leonard Trelawney Hobhouse hold such a view. 
' . 
According to this theory, God is limited in power, or lmowledge, 
:or both. Hence the presence of evil-God lacks the power to overcome 
i:i.t completely. But He does have power to combat it, and, with the help 
I 
rf' man, a h:igher order =be evolved. The universe is gradnally tend-
d.ng toward pe;ct'ection through the co-operative efforts of God and man. 
This thesis is designed to examine such a theory, as held variously 
y James, Rashdall and Hobhouse. Each differs from the others as to his 
1 
v 
concept of the nature of God's limitations~ as well as the form or 
pattern being taken by evolution. However, the central idea remains 
the same, with numerous notable parallels of thought. 
2. Definitions 
No special meanings are applied to the ordinary language of this 
2 
thesis. Those words which are given specific;usage are here indicated. 
HEmergent evolutionll denotes a view which holds that the universe is 
proceeding in a course of higher and htgher development, With novel 
and unpredictable changes appearing along the way. It is a term 
adopted by the writer to express a certain aspect 0~othe theolJr of 
these three men. These men believe that the universe is proceeding 
in a course of higher and higher development; the universe is slowly 
I 
I 
:getting better and better¢ it is not s~tic, but pnogressi-ve. 11Better" 
I 
j here implies a state more ideal for ali forms of life in the universe. 
This progress is an evolution~ but not a strictly limited evolution. 
~I Evolution, according to Webster r s Dictionary, is "an unfolding; 
I a process of opening out what is contained or implied in something; 
[ 
a development, esp.; as leading to a definite end." This definition 
lsuite the view of James, Rashdall and Hobhouse except for the phrase 
i 
: rrcontained or implied in. fJ So here emergent evolution is used to 
! modify this meani.'tlg and provide for the, appearance of new elements. 
i 
\This saves the evolution from be±ng an ~utomatic, mechanical process 
l 
, of development, and allows the possibility of new forces operating. 
:The term emergent evolution is not used by any of these men to describe 
'I 
,} 
his own position. It is as.edxhere in an attempt to express an idea 
I 
!found to be common among these men. 
"Finite God11 ·applies to a God limited in any of his attributes: 
:love, knowledge, presencej justice or power. In the thought of the 
I writers here considered the limitation is in God's power. '1Evil" is 
generally used in this thesis in its common meaning as something injur-
ious, calamitous, producing dis~tsss0to sentient beings. More specif-
ically it is distinguished as being of two different natures, moral 
· and physical. ! By moral evil is meant the wrong doing of human beings, 
and its consequences which often affect the innocent along with the 
guilty. These evils are in some way dependent on human volition • 
. Physical evil refers to the effects of natural conditions which are 
: I I adverse to man* Floods, earthqual{es, famines, diseases fall within 
I this category of calamaties which fall_l indifferently on good men and 
bad men. These are evils for which men are or appear to be in no way 
to blame, although they suffer from them. 
The word tromnipotent" is accepted for the purposes of this study, 
in its meaning of "unlimited in power. u On this basis, to consider 
omnipotence as possessing all the power there is, or as the most power-
ful being, is to apply too narrow a meaning. To say that God has all 
the power there is not only leaves the possibility ~f a limitation 
in the extent of that)pm•rer, but carri~s with it a real limitation on 
man 1 s power. Nothing created by God could have any power, if God has 
it all. Therefore, we are justified in understanding omnipotence to 
mean having infinite power. 
(§. Limitations 
This thesis seeks to exarn.ihe the thinking of three men as it 
applies to evil in terms of emergent evolution and a finite God. 
; As 
j is 
I 
a preliminary step several common explanations are reviewed. It 
the writer's intention to present these various positions sympa-
thetically, although no detailed analysis or history of each will be 
possible here. The review is intended to be primarily descriptive~ 
followed by brief refer~nce to some criticisms which apply to these 
explanations. 
The main focus is then £entered on that particular explanation 
involving emergent evolution and a limited God. This view, as it is 
found in James, Rashdall and Hobhouse, is examined in more detail, 
' showing their reasons for considering yhe subject as they do and 
! . I 
:describing the conditions they ascribe\to emergent evolution and a 
! finite God. 
No attempt is ID3.de to trace this thinking to previous philo-
I 
! sophers~ This study is not concerned to decide whether, for example, 
! 
; James ''borrowedlf or· nadapted" the bulk of his argument from J .s. Mill 
or Charcot. The writer accepts the positions of these men as their 
own, regardless of how derived, and attempts to describe what these 
positions are. A real attempt is made to present this particular 
explanation of evil on all of its own merits. In the course of the 
4 
exposition, no attempt is mde to present it from the point of view of 
a particular strength or weakness. 
( 
4~ Methodology of the Thesis 
The subject is presented in three main parts. There is a chapter 
devoted to the review of several common explanations of evil. Each 
I 
' 
5 
view is presented in terms of the various thinkers who expounded it. 
I 
Chapters III and IV deal with the joint aspects of the theory 
t with which this thesis is primarily concerned, with Chapter III focu-
sing on the limited God idea, and Chapter IV that of emergent evolution. 
!After suggesting reasons why some men have been driven to accept the 
notion of a finite God and briefly outlining previous similar theories, 
Chapter III proceeds to this theory as found in James, Rasbdall and 
j Hobhouse. The nature of the limitation and each man's particular 
. reasons:-:lf'6x:<9-tri'Vilig at a finitist theory are described. 
i 
In Chapter IV the place of a theory of emergent evolution in 
the problem. of explaining evil is given special attention. Then the 
unique relation of this idea to that of a limited God is examined. 
. I 
This chapter describes how such a join~ theory is offered by James, 
' 
Hobhou.se and Rashdall as a plausible ei,planation of the facts of human 
experience. 
5. Biographical Sketches 
Of the three men whose ideas are herein presented, two were 
1 Englishmen, with similar family and educational backgronnds. Both 
I were sons of clergymen, and both were educated in the British public 
1 
school system, finished off "With study at Oxford. The third was Amer-
ican, both by birth and in spirit, with a much more erratic background. 
The road by which William James arrived at his position 
of leadership among American philosophers was, during his 
childhood, youth and early maturity, quite as circuitous 
and unpr~raj_ctable as were his father r s ideas on the train-
ing of his children.l 
1
, 1 .. William James, The Varieties of Religious ~rience (New York: 
~andom Hous~, 1902), p. v. (unsigned introduction). 
6 
William James was born in New York City on January ll, 1842. 
I 
! His .father had attended Princeton Theological Seminary but gave up 
his plans for the ministry because of his antipathy t6. . ecclesiastie:. 
cisms .1 A.fter a long intellectual search he .finally adopted and 
adapted the doctrines o.f the great Swedish mystic, Swedenborg. The 
physical and spiritual restlessness of the .father affected the dev-
~lppment of his children, their education and their serious tempera-
' ment. William's schooling was divided between New York, Paris, Provi-
dence and Cambridge. After studying painting with John La.Farge he 
teaching, .filling lectureships, and writing. He .first taught psycho-
I 
logy, later becoming a professor of philosophy. He was invited to 
give several important lectures including the Gifford Lectures (1901-
02), the Lowell Lectures (1906-07) and the Hibbert Le:etures (l908-09). 
Among his most important works are: Principles of Psychology (1890), 
The Will to Believe and other Essay-e (l897), The Varieties of Reli~ 
gious Experience (1902), Pragmatism (1907), and A Pluralistic Uni-
verse (1909). 
James•s Principles of Psychology established the .functional 
point of view in psychology. 2 After completing this work his interest 
1. 1'William James, tt Encyclopaedia Britannica, XIV, 883. 
2. Ibid., p. 884. 
7 
sbi:rted more toward the problems of philosophy and religion. ·with the 
: publication of Pragmatism he became lfthe centre of a new life for phil-
'. osophy in the English speaking world. ttl Thus this man made his mark on 
both psychology and philosophy. His Varieties of Religious E?CQerience 
remains the standard scientific work on the psychology of the religious 
impulse.2 
As an American, James 11 ••• felt the stimulation of a nation 
young in heart and rich in opport.uni ty and hope, and caught so well 
the spirit of :his age and place that he was lifted on the wings of the 
Zeitgeist to a lonely pinnacle of popularity such as no other American 
philosopher had ever known. »3 Alburey Castell, in describing the work 
I 
of James, says that few authors have been better able to communicate 
the spirit of humane philosophizing. 4 I UJames understood, as few aca-
demics and intellectuals seem to, what you might call the perennially 
human point of view-."5 The importance: of this man in the world of 
ideas can hardly be ~~:overestimated~ 
Hastings Rashdall was born June 24, 1858 in London, the son of 
a minister of the Church of England. He attended Harrow where he was 
an active student and excelled in all area~ of study, EJspecially the 
2. James, The Varieties of FeJ..:Jgi_9u_s~.Experience, p. v, (unsigned introduction). 
:3. 'WiB:::-~ant, The Story of Philosoph:y: (New York: Pocket Books, In~., 
/J-92fjl952)' p. 509. 
4. Alburey .Castell (ed.), Essays in Praff':-tism by William James (New 
York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1952 , p. vii. 
S. Ibid., p. viii. 
classics, divinity and history.1 In 1877 he enrolled at New College, 
of which he subsequently became Fellow, Tutor, and finally Honorary 
Fellow. Tbe major work of his early years was a three volume study, 
The Uriiversities of Europe in the Middle Age§3 published by the Oxford 
University Press in 1895. "In many ways it was a subject suited to his 
geriius, for i~ appealed to his interest in the progress of knowledge, 
and particularly of religious and theological thought. n2 
He left Oxford in 1883 and the same year received his first 
. . 
appointment at St. David 1 s College, ~peter, where he lectured on St. 
' Luke, Sophocles, Virgil and Cicero. While at Lampeter Rashdall contem-
plated holy orders and was t.hinking out for himself the fundamental 
· problems on the border-land of philoso],hy am.d theology. In 1886 he 
i 
· was examined ~or· priest's orders, and .,-as ordained on June 28 of that 
· year~ II 
I 
In 1888 he was elected to a Fel10wship at Hertford, which brought 
him back to his alma mater. From 1895 until 1917 he was connected w.i. th 
. New College as Fellow and Tutor, and from 1910-1917 was also Canon of 
! HeFeford. In 1917 he was installed as Dean of Carlisle, remaining at 
I . 
: that post until his death on February 9, 1924. 
of it: 
His book Theory of Good and Evil appeared in 1907. Matheson says 
The book at once established itself as an able and stimula-
ting discussion of the principles of ethics and their 
:------
1 l. P.E. Matheson, The Life of Hastings Rashdall D.D. (London: Oxford 
University Press, l92E), p. 23. . . 
2. ~., p. 39. 
ap£>ilii'G.atiof.J.s:. :; • 
... ·Whatever judgement may be passed on its metaphysics or 
on the adequacy of the principle of r Ideal Utili tariani.sm 1 
there expounded, it bears the impress of a philosopher who 
makes a valiant attempt to grapple with ethical problems, 
and who illuminates his ideas by vivid and arresting practi-
cal illustrations. The book is :the summing up of his ethical 
teaching, and he never abandoned. this position.l 
9 
Two things may be said of his religious teaching. He was a master 
of clear statement and shirked no issues. He looked at all theolo-
gical questions with a view to their bearing on life. His theology, 
like his philosophy, was not a garment which he wore but a part of 
the liiber of his being. 2 One of Rashdall' s friends wrote of him: 
lli do not think that in our time any lcclesiastic., taken all rounci.; 
stooa intellectually quite on a level with lllm. The pity is, .full 
use was never made of him by his generation. lt3 
Born on September 8, 1864 at St. Ive near Liskeard, Cornwall, 
' Leonard Trelawney Hobhouse was the son ·of a rector. He described his 
mother as a ".first-rate co:mpanion"4, vivacious and witty; his .father 
as "an incarnation of justice and. iron recti tude, n5 whose sole guide 
was duty, for his children as :for himself. 
Young Hobhouse attended a preparatory school in Exmuth until 
1877, when, at the age o.f twelve, he entered Marlborough College. 
l. ~., p. 117. 
2';lE:l:id., p. 252. 
~. ~· 
4. J.A. Hobson and Morris Ginsberg, L.T. Hobhouse, His Life and Work 
(London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1931), p. 105. 
5. ~' p. 16. 
10 
In 1883 he entered Corpus at Oxford, i'i'here he had a distinguished 
career as a student, and later was appointed assistant tutor in 
! 
philosophy and then a Fellow there. ~owever, he never f'elt himself' 
cut out i'or the lif'e of' a college 11don. n He always wanted to get 
into closer contact with the practical ai'i'airs of' li.fe. Knowledge 
and the lii'e of' reason were never conceived by him merely as ends in 
themselves, but as contributions to the wider purpose o.f a better human 
lii'e. In this sense he always remained a pragrn.atist.l 
Hobson says of this energetic revolt! 
It was inherent in Hobhouse 1 s conception of the philosophic 
task to which he had already consciously set himself', the 
study of the evolution of mind as the central process in 
history. In order to make this process real to himself' and 
to others, he had to try to enter it, so to speak, at both 
ends, where it came out in pr~sent human endeavour and work, 
and where it first made itself' :manif'est as a conscious pro-
cess.2 
I 
And so he decided to leave Oxi'o:Jd and ffthrow himself' into active 
.r 
journalism and political activities. n3 He became a part-time journa-
list i'or the Manchester Guardian in 1897, which gave him time to con-
tinue pursuit of' the philosophical' and sociological studies which 
remained his primary_ colfcern. In 1907 he beqamec:.s.oo:iology . .:{;r.01fles§or at 
~"'e ;Un:Lvel''Si ty/bf'~ ':"llQnd.O.n;;..-; and was thus drawn f'rom general philosophy 
into social philosophy and the social sciences, toward which his 
interest had been moving f'or some time. He remained at this post up 
to the time of' his death, June 21, 1929. 
:afs i'irst major work, entitled Mind in Evolution was published 
1. ~., P• 27. 2. Ibid., p. 26 3. Ibid., p. 37. 
I 
I 
I 
in 1901. The publication in 1906 of his Morals in Evolution marked 
an epoch in the study of Sociology.l The following description of 
this work appeared in the Manchester Guardian in 1929: 
Here Hobhouse revealed at the~ best the amazing range of 
his powers. A grasp of anthro-pological .fact, of' ethical 
fuliebr.y;; of the history o.f·:religions and institutions--all 
were combined to lay the foundations of a humanism never 
more impressively stated. 2 
The book which he considered his richest contribution to the 
thought of hl.s time was Development and Purpose, which first appeared 
in 1913. Throughout his life he continued to concern himself with 
the practical issues of poll tics, both internal and .foreign. He was 
never widely knol'IIl, but his original work has had wide influence. 
I 
f
1Great thinking bears its chief frui:t in other minds, and there will 
ll 
be many thinkers who have gathered knowledge and stimulus from Hobhouse 
as oral teacher.n3 
!l. ~., p. 47. 2. Ib~d. ~ ·.--. 3. Ibi:&i., p. 73 -- ~'-· 
-
'\ 
• 5HA1?TER rr 1 
,A REVIEW OF SOME COMMON EXPLANATIONS OF THE PROBLEM: OF ~ 
Evil is a constant and obvious fact of human experience. Examples 
of evil, both moral and physical, can be seen on all sides. Job, in 
the Old Testament, o:f:fers one of the most extreme and pathetic examples 
o:f human suffering at its worst. This pious man was tested to the 
extent o:f his endurance by every imaginable :form of affliction and loss .. 
First, his animals and servants were killed or carried o:f:f; then his 
children were killed; next, Satan covered Job•s body with sore boils. 
Finally, to add insult to injury, his .friends brought reproach cmd con-
denmation. to this man while he was being tried to such unbearable ,.~''[{:_: .-:: · .. c , 
1 
extremes. 
A mere enumeration o:f these sufferings is enough to impress any 
sensitive human being vd th the terrible nature o:f this kind o:f treatment. 
But, 'even more than this, the depths of agony expressed by this victim.-
ized human being serve to impress one acutely wit._n the sense o:f utter 
evil :found here. 
The arrows o:f the Almighty are in me; my· spirit drinks their 
poison; the terrors of God are arrayed against me. 
God gives me up to the ungodly, and casts me into the hands 
of the wicked. 
Oh that thou wouldest hide me in Sheol, that thou wouldest 
conceal me until thy -wrath be past, that thou wouldest 
appoint me a set time, and remember me j2 
1. Job 1:14-19; 2:7. (Revised Standard Version) 
2. Job~6:4; 16:11; 14:13. 
1.2 
13 
The famous Lisbon earthquake offers another striking example 
of evil. This outstanding instance of physical evil occurred on All 
Saints Day, while the churches were crowded with those celebrating the 
special day, November 1, 1755. Between 10,000 and 20,000 persons were 
killed, as a direct result of the earthquake, or of the ensu±il:g~~tidal 
wave and fire.l It was a terrible blow to a Europe which had grown 
content in its acceptance of optimistic rationalism~ Following the 
lead of Leibniz and Pope, the rational man of the 18th een~ had 
learned to be "content with everything in spite of anything.n2 Vol-
taire, in his story, Candide, brought the problems raised by such a 
catastrophe to wide attel"j.tion. However, he was not the only one whose 
1 
system of values was challenged, or indeed endangered, by the great 
earthquake. Its effects are renected also in the thinking of Jean 
Jacques Rousseau, John Wesley, Immanuel Kant and Goethe.3 
While evil has undoubtedly always been wi tJ;r the human race, cases 
such as that of Job and the Lisbon earthquake serve to sharpen and 
quicken interest in and speculation about the problem in general. 
From the days of Job and his comforters, the devising of 
such theodicies-theories to save the situation-has been 
the main business of theology and theological metaphysics.4 
Through the centuries, countless attempts have been made to explain, 
1. ·WLisbon,n Encyclopaedia Britannica, XIV, 198. 
2. Edgar Sheffield Brightman, 11The Lisbon Earthquake! A Study in 
Religious Valuation,tt American Journal of Theology, XXIII (1919), 
. 5o3. 
3. Ibid., pp. 5o4-5l5. 
4. A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, The Idea of God in Light of Recent Philos-
~ (2nd ed. rev.; New Yorkt Oxford University Press, ll9Ig/l920), 
P.4oo. 
rjustif'y, rationalize, or solve this problem of evil. This .chapter 
presents a review of some of these attempts, especially as they have 
occurred within the Christian tradition. No attempt will be made to 
disprove any of these answers, but some of the problems raised by each 
"Will be introduced. 
In the course of this investigation, five explanations of evil 
will be examined. According to these views, evil is: (1) unreal, 
(2) invomplete good, (3) necessary as a contrast to good, (4) punish-
ment or discipline, and (5) the result of human freedom. 
1. Evil is Unreal 
Evil is some illusion, or an error of the human mind. The Hindus 
refer to this phenomenon as :pia.ya. There is no evil really; only a tem-
porary mistaking.1 Hinduism classifies the entire material world in 
this category of illusion, which includes with it the incidence of evil. 2 
Likewise, for the Christian Scientist, there is no such thing as evil. 
For them, flthe judgment that it is real is simply a false judgment; the 
opinion that it is objective or permanent is an error. u3 Referring to 
the outlook promulgated by Mary Baker Eddy, Tsanoff points out: 
The evidence of experience to the contrary is rejected, 
since forsooth nhealth is not a condition of matter but of 
Mind; nor can the material senses bear reliable testimony 
on the subject of health. 11 Such error may be far-spread, 
as stubborn as it is pernicious, but "When enlightened by 
the Truth man can overcome and transcend the illusion. We 
may labor under grievous delusions, as the founder-mother did 
1. Robert Ernest Hume, The World 1 s Living RelMions (rev. ed.; New York; 
Charles Scribner1 s Sons, Ll92li/1953), p. · 2 • 
2. Ibid .. ' p. 25. 
3. Edgar Sheff'ield Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion (New York: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1940), p. 270. 
J 
i] 
\ 
Wheri she wrote to Dr. Quimby about her "spinal inflamation 
and ·its train of sufferings bastric and.bilious;'' but in-
sight and illumination will show us as it showed her that 
disease is but error, and that, for instance, arsenic is 
P?isonous only because of man's general delusion that it 
is a poison. 
. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . 
But here is Godl s own world, really perfect, a very para-
dise did man but know it; and yet in this bower of bliss 
man labors under grievous illusions of harrowing alleged 
diseases, to his sorrow believing that arsenic is a poison, 
tortured apparently by the seeming su.f.fering and decease 
of those he loves, and in the end like all men before him 
succumbing to the .fixed delusion that he is dead. 
15 
Such an explanation appears to take care of the problem by denying the 
existence of the problem. 
St. Augustine, in his nee-Platonic orientation, similarly dis-
counts the reality of evil, by granting existence only to good, "if 
(things) shall be deprived of all good, they shall no longer be. So 
long therefore as they are, they are good; therefore whatsoever is, 
is good. Tba t evil then which I sought, is not any substance; for 
were it a substance, it should be good.,tt2 
Another approach to the explanation of evil as not actually 
existing is .found in Maimonides, who asserts that: 
.All the great evils which men cause to each other because. 
of ~ertain intentions, desires, opinions, or religious prin-
ciples, are likewise due to non-existence, because they orig-
inate in ignorance, which is absence of wisdom. 3 
We see then that evil as a supposed re8.l fact and separate from 
l. Radoslav A. Tsanof.f, The Nature of Evil (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1931), pp. 373-374. 
2. St. Augustine, The Confessions of St. Augu,stine (New York: E. P. 
Dutton & Go., Inc., 1909), p. ll3. 
3. Moses Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed (London: George Routledge 
& Sons, Limited, 1947), p. 267. 
16 
goodness, as a totally independent entity, is and must be an illusion. 
nso the immobile eye of the ascetic saint, waiting for the hour of 
release, looks with disdainful equanimity on this wretched riot of 
illusion. lfl 
2. Evil is Incomplete Good 
For those absolute idealists who hold that the true is the whole, 
and therefore the whole alone is truly good, it follows that evil, in 
so far as it is actually evil, is merely the lack of good. A partial 
view of anything is !inadequate; that is why, to £!!E. eyes, there is evil, 
but in the eyes o:f the "all seeing" there is no real evil. A few pro-
positions from an argument are all but meaningless until their relation 
to the whole is grasped. The various patches of color within a paint-
ing are ugly by thems~lves, . while the total effect of the painting may 
be beautiful .. 2 This theory is based on the faith that the whole is, 
ipso facto, good. All apparent imperfection is an illusion of our 
partial view. This approach is also found in St. Augustine: 
.And to Thee is nothing whatsoever evil: yea, not only to 
Thee, but also to Thy creation as a whole, because there 
is nothing without, which may break in, and corrupt that or 
order vrhich Thou has appointed it. But in the parts thereof 
some things, because unharmonising with other some, are 
accounted evil: whereas those very things harmonise with 
others, and are good; and in themselves are good. And all 
these things which harmonise not together, do yet with the 
inferior part, which we call Earth, having its own cloudy 
and windy sky harmoni.sing with it. Far be it then that I 
should say, tThese things should not beT: for should I see 
nought but these I should indeed long for the better, but 
still must even for these alone praise thee; ••• and with 
1. Tsanoff, The Nature of Evil, p. 8. 
. ' 
2. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion, p. 264. 
t a sounder judgment I apprehen,ded that the things above were 
better than these beyow, but altogether better than those 
above by themselves. ,. 
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Evil is thus understood as 11an illusion of the partial view, as 
the shapelessness of the fragment of a statue is no disproof of the 
real beauty of the whole. 112 If our view were complete we would be able 
to see that good is complete. 
Another view of evil as incomplete good distinguishes evil in 
terms of privatioh.. It is a sort of vacuum, as yet unfilled by good, 
but, assumedly, eventually to be fj_lled by good. Evil is found in the 
physical world when an organism j_s not functloning properly, when it is 
not attalning its optimum, not achi.evJ.ng its ultimate perfection in its 
particular function. In the moral world, evil occurs when man does not 
live in perfect harmony as he is intended, when hi.s choices do not pro-
mote the ideal. 
A body whi.ch performed j_ ts functions perfectly would 
have no evJ.l in it, and what we mean by evil is a lack of 
perfectlon, a falling short of s~me standard whi.ch we 
acknowledge to be the right one. · 
Evil_, then, has no independent existence; it is merely a gap, waitj_ng 
to be filled with good. It j_s important to recognize this fact, and 
to operate on the faith that the Whole j_s perfectly good, so each must 
work toward that perfect whole. 
3. Evil is Necessary as a Contrast to Good 
If we didn't have evil, we would not know when we had good. Life 
1. St. Augustine, Confessions, p.l27. · 
2. Daniel J. Bronstem and Harold Schulweis, (eds.), Approaches to the Phj_l-
osophy of Religion (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1954), p. 277. 
3. M.G. D1Arcy, The Pain of this World and the Providence of God (London: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1935), P• 3. 
vfould be unbearabzy dull without this other aspect for comparis<bn. 
Otherwise no one would appreciate the goodness; perhaps no one would 
be aware of' goodness if' there were nothing by way of' contrast. "The 
absence of' the evil impulse leaves naught but innocence or instinct, 
morally insipid and colorless."1 
Many analogies have been o:ff'ered in support of' this view, as 
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for example that of' consciousness: "if' we were continuously conscious, 
we should never know what consciousness really means. So, too, good 
is in perpetual danger of' being lost by its centrast and conf'lict wi tb. 
evil. This alone teaches us its value~n2 
Exponents of' this view maintain that we would not be satis:fied 
with a world in which there was no evil. The idea of' a state of' per-
feet goodness is repugnant to many. 
With bitter and exaggerated irony a Spanish satirist has 
tried to show that if' we got rid of' the devil and the seven 
chief sins we should soon have to send a deputation begging 
him to return to relieve the monotony of extstence. • • • 
Why, our greatest dif':fieulty in appreciating heaven and the 
li:fe of' God is that we3eannot imagine them save as duckponds o:f stagnant happiness! 
And who could bear to live in a duckpond of' stagnant happiness--
:forever? What a dull existence that would be; dull to the point of' 
being intolerable. Man would have no basis for perceiving, let alone 
appreciating, the good. Li:fe vvould thus become neutral, and in :fact 
inconsequential. There would exist no incentive, no desire to cherish 
['and aspire to the good because everything would already be saturated 
1. Bronstein, Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion (John Laird), p. 27 7. 
2. Brightman, A Philosophy of' Religion, p. 265. 
1 3 •. D1Arcy, The Pain of' This World, p. B. 
i with good. 
i 
' Some assert that pain is the necessary background to pleasure. 
And pain is stimulating, educational, preventative, and remedial. 
These are positive £actors which must be admitted in a consideration 
l o£ evil. The contrasts o£ experience o£ten do stimulate the good. 
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We must there£ore affirm evil if we appreciate .good. "Give me 
evil_, so that I may know good. ff 
4. Evil is Punishment or Discipline 
Evil can be justified when it is understood to be punishment. 
Or, evil is necessary for purposes of discipline, with punishment play-
ing an instrumental role. 
This fact of evil as punishment is what Job's friends were try-
ing to impress upon him. Eliphaz points out, "Behold, happy is the 
man ~om God reproves; therefore despise not the chastening o£ the 
:Almighty. rr2 Bildad tells Job that if he were pure and upright, God 
. would surely answer his need, and rrreward you with a rightful habi-
tation.n3 
Such a position is based on the as~tion that each man deserves 
all the evil 'Which he in fact suffers. The indidence of evils is a per-
, ie.e,tly just punishment for sins committed by human beings. It points 
bravely and unfalteringly to the Just God, meting out due punishments 
and rewards. 
1. Brightman, A Philosophy o.f Religion, p. 266. 
2. Job .5:17. 
! 3. Job 8:6 
I 
·e 
Tempted by the Devil, ••• man disobeyed the divine com-
mand, and sin entered the human race. Because of sin God 
condemned all mankind to everlasting punishment.l 
If we suffer, God must have willed that we so suffer because we have 
sinned. .And so evil should be accepted with hu.mili ty and. remorse. 
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This punishment may be retributive or retaliative; or it may be 
instrumental in the form of chastisement, with a vieW to reformation or 
amendmente This latter view introduces evil as a disc:lpline. Here the 
i purpose of evil is disn·overed to be necessary to reform or test a person. 
It is presented as a challenge to human character, with the promist 
that by meeting the evil and overcoming it one advances on the ladder 
to perfection. Such a view endorses a 11rugged individualism11 attitude, 
and appeals to our active sense of responsibility. 
One should welcome all the various tests and obstacles as ceca-
sions for triumph and progress. Without such aids, we might never 
reach real lmman values, because of lack of motivation, or sheer leth-
argy. The challenge-response principle which has been found to be of 
great importance in other aspects of life is seen operating here like-
·wise. Human nature at its best emerges when it is constantly spurred 
' on to the realization of its complete potentiality. 
! 
Without struggle., as we have seen, the ascent of man is 
almost impossible, and may it not be that God has been 
far wiser than his critics in assigning to man a world 
in which the prospect of defeat must ever be real, the 
obstacles, too, ingrained in the world's constitution, 
and happiness always attainable where mutual good w:ill 
obtains and courage is alive?.2 
1. William Kelley Wright, A Student's Philosophy of Religion (rev. ed., 
New York: The Macmillan Company, ,Ll92k/1937), p. 377. 
: 2. D1Arcy_, The Pain of' This World, p. 10. 
\ 
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John Laird points out that we :find empirically, that some su:f-
:feting has a beneficial :function, and we may well surmise that :fre-
quently, though this beneficial :function may hot be apparent, it may 
l 
nevertheless occur. 
Physical trial and su:f:fering which at :first sight are such 
a dis:figurBment o:f li:fe turn.out in the end to be the neces-
sary ~ccompaniment o:f our virtue and the stimulus to perfec-
tion. 
Who can deny that many apparent evils turn out to be goods in 
disguise, or that evil is quite often instrumental in the realization o:f 
some greater good. Hardship develops character. A community disaster 
I 
often elicits co-operation and a sense o:f human brotherhood. Many noble 
spirits dwell 1n crippled and diseased bodies. ttSu:f:fering teaches sym.-
pathy.u3 
It is commonly accepted that certain disciplines have a real 
value. Here the goal is our own :fulfillment, perfection, so the dis-
cipline should be undertaken gladly. 
5. Evil is the Result o:f Human Freedom 
Perhaps the favorite and most relied upon answer te the problem 
of evil is that it is the result of human freedom. Evil is a built-in 
requisite if man is to have free 'Will. Robert Hume, in his discussion 
o:f the place o:f evil in Christianity says: lfGod is responsible for the 
possibility of evil in the world through having given :free will to man; 
l. Bronstein, Approaches to the Philosophy o:f Religion, p. 265. 
2 .. D1Arcy, The Pain of This World, p. 13 .. 
3. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion, p. 262. 
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1 • • • each individual is directly responsible for choosing evil, rather 
:than good.u l 
If life would be dull without the contrast of good and evil, it 
;would actually be mechanical without dreedom. to choose between good and 
i 
1 evil. Many traditional theologies have thus argued that without the 
I ability to choose uncoercedly among alternative actions, man would be 
'I reduced to an automaton. 2 As F. R. Tennant puts it: flThere cannot be 
[)moral goodness in a creature such as man without the possibility of 
! his sinnfug. Without freedom to choose the evil, • a man might be 
I 
:a well-behaved puppet "· ~ • but not a ~oral agent. rt3 Man must retain 
[ a moral status, and to do so he must have freedom. 
A code of morality is deficient which does not so frame 
laws that man is left free to choose between right and 
wrong •••• The gift of liberty, therefore, takes aWfJ.Y 
all responsibility from God for the evil done by man.4 
Providence would not be gracious to man-if he denied man such oppor-
, tunities. There must be moral evil if there is to be moral good. n5 
:so, not only is freedom necessary for man 1s moral goodness, but the 
:doctrine of free will is necessary in order to preserve Godts good-
1. Hume_, The Worldrs Living Religions, p. 256. 
2. Bronstein, Approaches to. the Philosophy of Religion (Schulweis), p. 292. 
3. Frederick Robert Tennant, Philoso~hical Theology, Vol. II (Cambridge, 
England: The University Press, 19 6), p. 188. 
4. DtArey, The Pain of tllihs World, pp. ,11-12. 
5. Bronstein, Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion (Laird), p. 268. 
'\ 
' 
To reward and punish creatures who a:re not free agents is 
not consistent with God's goodness. If goodness is a part 
of the divine nature, it follows that God must have created 
man a free agent.l 
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The idea of the human individual as a simple machine is repulsive 
to many; if not most, men. This removes from the person any intrinsic 
:.moral value. Whatever one does is meaningless, because he cannot do 
[otherwise~ In order to be saved from such a disastrous view of life, 
i/ 
many have been satisfied that evil, sin, sufferin~, are the price man 
·must pay if he is to be free. 
I 
The "fallff of man symbolizes the type of experience which 
comes to every human being by virtue of the fact that he 
is a moralbeing capable of chobsing either good or evil. 
The presence of evil as a fact -which brings temptation to 
man is, like the good which ~e may choose, a necessary 
condi ti.on for moral freedom. 
!Freedom thus takes precedence over evil. Traditionalists often appeal 
i 
;to the greater value of human freedom of the will -which, it is said, 
more than compensates for the evil brought about by human choice) 
Freedom must therefore be preserved at all costs.. 1fWe human 
beings love liberty so much that we willingly take the risk of evil 
'.for the sake of liberty. n4 The cry becomes, If Give me evil, for I 
,must have freedom. u 
In all of these solutions God is absolved of any real responsi-
lbility :for the presence o:f evil. Plato predicted this type o:f theo-
1. Ibid. ' p •. 340. 
2. Charles H. Patterson, Moral Standards: An Introduction to Ethics (2nd 
ed.; New York: The Ronald Press Comp!3Jly, Zl912/l9S7), pp. 318-319. 
13· Bronstein, Approaches to the Phil~sophy of Religioh (Schulweis), p. 292. 
i4. Dr.Arcy, The Pain of This World, p. 19. 
ry 
I 
x 
I ' 
24 
!Mcy when he said, "what is good we nmst ascribe to no other than God, 
.. 
! but we must seek elsewhere, and not in him, the causes of wbat is evil.u:L 
6. Difficulties Raised by These Answers 
There appears to be no simple solution to the problem of evil. 
:Although any given solution offers strong recommendations· on one side, 
, weaknesses can be found on another side. The following observation of 
I i real life contains extreme examples of both moral and physical evils. 
i 
. Such a case serves to point up difficulties embodied in the five explan-
I ations just reviewed. 
I 
The tiny girl sitting with her baby sister on the curb in Chicago 1 s 
near North side is deformed by polio. She stares blankly at the passing 
: cars and people, waiting for this day to be over, and the next, and the 
I next. She might go home to a fourth floor flat; but there is no one 
J there, and no reason to go. Her mother is at work. .And no one knows 
· where her father is; they think maybe he is in California. She is hun-
. gry, but again, all she can do is wait with her hunger. She has already 
i spent the 25¢ her mother gave her for their lunch. It is too painful to 
·walk, or run, or play. So she just sits, clutching the hand of her little 
sister whom she must take care of. Her frail, deformed body is clothed 
: in a not too ragged dress, but no shoes will ever really fit her feet. 
There is an occasional tear, but for the most part she just sits quietly 
and waits. Six months later she is dead from pneumonia. 
l. Plato, The Republic (New York: Oxfo~d University Press, 1945), p. 71. 
~1 
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To the observer of this scene, none of the explanations reviewed 
1 in this chapter are satisfactory. This situation is~· This child 
I 
i is too young to be able to conceptualize it as an illusion or a 11tempor-
! ary mistaking." For her it is real, painfully so. And to say that it 
is just incomplete good, necessary as a contrast to good, punishment or 
discipline, or the result of human freedom, is not to speak to the awful 
fact represented by this child.. What would it mean to this child to 
:say that what she was experiencing was simply incomplete good, or a 
(partial awareness of something that was actually good? Or to say, 
• llCheer up, you must suffer this way or you will never be able to apprec-
;iate lack of suffering.n So the child dies; she in fact never does know 
:what it is not to suffer, but not from lack of evil to contrast with 
good. On the contrary, she never experienc~d enough good to contrast 
with the evil. Again, can we tell her it is her own .fault, f'You deserve 
'this punishment you are receiving; and only by undergoing this disci-
: 
: pline will you ever amount to anything. n Or we might say, you are in 
I this condition because of your freedom, without which your life would 
:not be worth living. 
To offer these answers is not to speak to the awful fact repre-
: sented by this child. These become empty suggestions that try to ex-
! cuse a state of affairs that is inexcusable in terms of our common 
I 
sense of right and wrong. How can any God worthy of the name allow 
such a state o:f affairs, when human compassion is great enough to~ 
that this form of evil and all its counterparts might cease to be. 
i i Lowly man is able to will this; he simply is unable to ef.fect this 
I 
I 
i 
.. i--
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,willing. Then what of God? Either he :must will that this suffering 
~·exist, or, willing otherwise, he :must likewise be unable to prevent it. 
7. Objections Raised by James, Rashdall and Hobhouse 
i explanations. It was their intention that the explanation they offer 
1be more consistent with out expe±ience than the traditional arguments. 
! 
HoweverJ it would be wrong to assert that they were anti-tradi-
tional; or that they set up this theory in direct opposition to any or 
,all traditional answers. While they do attack some of these positions 
:specifically, their purpose seems more positive than negative. They 
:appear more concerned with developing a more satisfactory answer than 
with criticizing the traditional answers. Indeed, they appear to be 
constrained to avoid alienating the more or£hodox positions. This is 
1 
especially true of Rashdall and Hob house who, as clergy of the Church 
i of England, have a stake in trying to keep their theory as compatible 
i 
!with orthodoxy as possible. An example of their effort to do this, as 
!will be seen, arises when they attempt to place the responsibility for 
evil upon lfbad souls" or ttthe wicked will of mantr, but still cannot 
quite absolve God from creating such bad souls or wills. 
James states his reasons for objecting to the notion that evil 
is unreal, or that in the mind of God it is transferred into some beau-
tiful harmony. 1 He points out that the view that tries to ignore evil 
1 .. Wright, .A Student's Philosophy, of Religion, p. 378. 
!' 
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and not regard it as real is inadequate 11because the evil facts which 
it refuses positively to account for are a genuine portion of reality; 
i and they may after all be the best key to life 1 s significance, and 
1 possibly the only openers of our eyes to the deepest levels of tro.ll:;h. nl 
i 
; 
, Such a view which fails to accord to sorrow, pain and death any posi-
,tive and active attention whatever James finds "less complete than 
; systems that try at least to include these elements in·::their scope."2 
James admits that some evils contribute to higher forms of good, 
but this is still not an adequate answer: 
Some evils, indeed, are ministerial to higher forms of good; 
but it may be that there are fqrms of evil so extreme as to 
enter into no good system whatsoever, and that, in respect 
of such evil, dumb submi3sion or. neglect to notice is the 
only practical resource. 
According to Hastings Rashdall, reference to free choice exer-
·eised by man does not solve the problem of evil. 
Only a small part of the evil in the Universe can, on any 
view which does not refuse to look at the facts, be traced 
to the abuse of our power of undetermined choice. The hypo-
thesis will not account for the sufferings of animals, or 
for that enormous proportion of human suffering which does 
not in any way arise out of moral evil. ••• Nor will it 
account even for all moral evil. Such an enormous propor-
tion of the moraleY:il in the universe is clearly not due 
to the abuse of Freedom that the difficulty is only slightly 
attenuated by the introduction o{ an undetermined factor 
into the well-springs of action. 
I 
: Nor can evil be explained as providing for the developing of good. 
I Rashdall says it is obvious that some evil is the condition of the 
I 
' l. IIames3lTb,.eTVarieme::? of Religious Ewerience, p. l6o. 
2. Ibid.' p. 162. 
a. Ibid .. , p. 161. 
4. Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, P~ 342, 
,e 
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·good. But tliere is simply too much evil to be explained in these terms. 
!And, the distribution of evil as we see it, is not conducive to the 
i 
! greatest welfare of humanity. 1 
L. T. Hobhouse is not satisfied with the nmtion that evil is 
necessary as a contrast to good. 
The optimistic doctrine that the evil of the world is merely 
the dark colour which serves to show up the bright would be 
tenable upon two hypotheses. If evil and good were s.o distri-
buted that physical suffering, external calamities and moral 
wrong-doing played an essential part in the growth of each 
personality, and could be shown to tend ultimately to its 
greater perfection, the existence of evil would be reconcilable 
with a divine justice which should take every personality into 
account. Equally, if p3 rsonallty were left wholly out of 
account, it might be theoretically maintainable tbat the un-
equal distribution of evil in the world was a matter of no 
moment, provided that the -whole scheme of things be allowed 
to be sound at the core. The second alternative was not pos-
sible for any system which took account of personality at all.2 
I 
:He likewise finds fault with any explanation in terms of free will. If 
! the will is an expression of character, it figures as but one link in 
the endless chain of causes and effects. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
We may trace this chain back in the first instance to the 
original nature of the individual, and whether we say that 
this is determined by heredity or was what God made it, we 
are equally throwing the responsibility back on to something 
anterior to the individual, and on the creationmst principle 
this something must in the end be God himself. If, on the 
other hand, we deny that will is an expression of character, 
we not only assert something which is in itself unintelligible, 
l;>ut we in reality destroy the very responsibility which we are 
seeking to maintain. For responsibility ceases when identity 
of character ceases.3 
Ibid.' p. 236 .. 
L. T. Hobhouse, 
P• ~-9~. 
Morals in Evolution (London; Chapman & Hall, 1951), 
Ibid., p. 5o4. 
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cCHAPTER III 
f FINITE GOD AS AN ANSWER TO THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 
1. The Need for a More .Adequate .Answer 
Within the course of the development of Christian theology there 
I 
l inevitably came a time when the answer given by traditional theism to 
lthe problem of evil was no longer satisfactory. .According to this trad-
! 
' 
:itional view, God made man in bis own image. This man was innocent, 
iknowing neither good nor evil. Tempted 1 by a fallen angel, man diso-
1 ' 
!beyed God and sin entered the human race. Because of sin, God, in his 
~justice, condenm.ed all mankind to eternal punishment. But later, out 
:of his great love, he sent his son in the form of man to die for mankind 
(and thus satisfy divine justice.1 The problems raised by this solution 
i 
!had been alternately ignored and rationalized by components who felt 
ithe necessity of clinging to it at all costs. Such adherents to the 
ifaith could not-entertain the possibility that their point of view was 
I 
~intellectually untenable. And their sense of justice and rightness was 
!not sufficiently violated by their position to cause them seriously to 
;question it. 
; However, they could give no adequate answer to the contention that, 
lgiven the state of man and the world as we see it today and throughout 
' 
fhistory, God cannot be at the same time all wise, good, and powerful. 
f"If God be all wise, good, and powerful, He must have willed all that 
' . 
/1. Wright, .A Student's Philosophy of Religion, p. 371. 
29 
w· 
lhas come to pass, including human sinf'ulness, and the other evils and 
i 
I 
.imperfections,in the universe. But if He w.illed all these evils and 
'imperfections, He cannot be all wise, good, and powerful.nl 
i 
' 
So, after centuries of acceptance of this attitude toward the 
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;relationship of God and evil, the way was opened for numerous attempts 
at a more consistent answ'er.. Many solutions have been offered in good 
' 
faith, in an effort to reconcile the awful fact of evil with a sa tis-
f'actory conception of God. 
One interesting and plausible solution is to be f'ound in the 
,thinking of such men as William James, Hastings Rashdall and Leonard 
' 
1Trelawney Hobhouse. These men seek to solve the problem by combining 
i 
·~ theory of emergent evolution with. that of a finite God. 
! 
.According to such a . veiw, some qualif'ications must be made regard-
;ing God's infinite nature. Thus, according to their various outlooks, 
each has axrived at a theory of a God who is limited in one or more of 
! 
his attributes. For James, God is limited 11either in power or in know-
ledge, or in both at once.lt2 For Robhouse and Rashdallj the limitation 
is in the 
I 
power, again with variations as to the nature of the limi-
:tation in each case. 
i Coupled with the i:heory of a finite God is one of emergent evo-! 
~ution. Each of these men sees the order of the world in terms of pro-
i 
P'ess toward perf'ection. Such progress arises f'rom the co-operation of' 
__ fod with man and man With God. Things are getting better and better, 
I 
IL. ~·, P• .379. 
I 
r· William James, A Pluralistic Universe (New York~ Longmans, Green, and Co., 1909), p. 310. 
,. ) . , 
albeit through a slow and painful process, but, assuredly, a better 
order is emerging. 
2. Previous Theories o.f a Limited God. 
The possibility o.f a limited God as a coherent and consistent 
explanation o.f evil was opened up .for modern thought by John Stuart 
l Mill, although it can be traced as .far back as the GreeKs. Plato 
: developed this idea, and Pringle-Pattison characterizes it as apply-
• ing to Greek thought in general: 
Greek thought, on the whole, represents the divine action 
in this way, as that o.f an arti.ficer limited by the qualities 
o.f his material, and consequently surrenders the idea o.f a 
universe as a per.fect and coherent whole--this active mani-
.festation o.f a single principle.l 
31 
Hume likewise suggests a .finite deity as a way out o.f the di.f.fi-
culties posed by evil. The author o.f nature might be .finitely per.fect, 
though greatly exceeding mankind, and a satis.factory account could then 
• be given o.f natural and moral evil. 11Benevolence, reguM.ted by wisdom 
I 
and limited by necessity, may produce just such a world as the pre-
sent. n2 But Hume fails to develop this idea further, and Pringle-
Pattison suggests that perhaps Hume ftmeans us to understand that he 
i regards it also as irlconsistent with the power.ful impression of' unity 
i whi<bh the universe produces. n3 · 
John Stuarl Mill makes no attempt to try to solve the impossible I --
1-----
1. Pringle-Pattison, The Idea o.f God, pp. 4oo-4ol. 
2. David Hume, Tiialo%es on Natural Religion (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson 
and Sons, Ltd., 19 7), p. 249. 
3. Pringle-Pattison, The Idea o.f God, p. 401. 
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i 
I [problem of reconciling inf'inite benevolence with inf'inite power in 
' l 
'the creator of such a world as this. He points out that any attempt 
!to do so would involve absolute contradiction in an intellectual point 
!of view as well as moral perplexities. The evidence provided by nature 
1is inconsistent with a God of infinite benevolence, justice and power. 
And, looking only at the general indications of the evidence axailable, 
I 
!the greater part of the adaptation in nature seems not directed to a 
I 
'moral end at all, but "simply to keep the machine going.tt2 
It is only by granting a limitation that such difficulties can 
ibe avoided. 
i 
! 
Grant that creative power was limited by conditions the nature 
and extent o.f which are wholly Unknown to us, and the goodness 
and justice of the Creator may be all that the most pious be-
lieve; and all in the work that conflicts with those moral 
attributes may be the fault of ~he conditions which le.ft the 
Creator only a choice of evils. 
,The limitation of power Mill considers to be most probably due to the 
qualities o.f the material with which the Creator had to deal. Mill 
asserts that there is no reason to suppose that either matter or .force 
I 
:or any of their properties were made by the same Being who was the 
I 
' 
'author of the collocations by which the world is adapted to What we 
i 
:consider its purposes, or that he has the power to alter any of those 
I 4 . 
properties. 
I 
D... John Stuart Mill, Three Essays on Religion (New York: Henry Holt 
& Co., 1874), PP• 186=187. i 
i ~· Ibid., p. 190. 
p· Ibid.' p. 187. 
4. Ibid., pp. 186-187. 
! 
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Thus, the way was opened for futfuaer development of this theory 
of a limited God, in connection with rt>he problem of evil. During the 
I 
:remainder of this chapter the particular conception of a finite God, 
1 as espoused by James, by Hobhorise, and by Rashdall, will be examined. 
i Reference will be made at the same time to the accompanying notion of 
, emergent evolution, but this matter will be dealt1rwi.th more thoroughly 
the chapter to follow. 
3. Recent Theories of a Finite God. 
I l The three men included in this stydy were chosen because they 
!not only support the noti~n of a .finite\ God, but they do so in con-
i 
I 
!junction with an idea of emergent evolution. These men, then, have 
'not necessarily made the most extensive or profound exposition of the 
:limited God notion. Their significance for the purposes of this thesis 
tis their combined theory regarding an explanation of evil •. 
:i. William James 
I 
i 
I 
I 
. The philosophy of William James is notable for his contention 
'that human nature has a decisive voice in det~ining the tenability 
of a philosophy. He gives first place not to the truth of a philo-
' 
i~ophy, but to the conditions in us of its acceptability. In the last 
~alysis,. we, not nature, must authorize what we think about na.ture. 1 
~d so for him a conception of the world must square with the facts of 
human nature .. 
I 
It is on this basis that James dares to offer his notion of God 
i 
Castell, Essays on Pragii!atism by William James, Introduction, pp. x-xi •. 
I· 
as finite. An omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent God would violate 
!:rrtaR' s free will. To deny ifiree will is an outrage to the moral sense, 
! 
~and makes nonsense of human nature as we know it. But, more important 
!for our purposes, such a deity would be personally responsible for all 
' 
:of the evil in the world. Here again, with reference to human nature, 
! 
this is untenable. One cannot conceive of a God who is greater than 
:man, in goodness, as being responsible for the presence of evil in the 
! 
:world as we know it. 
1~eligious experience, as we have studied it, cannot be cited as 
:unequivocally supporting the infinitist belief. rrl The guidepost here 
is necessarily religious experience, and the only thing this unequivo-
: cally testifies to is experience of union with something larger than 
ourselves, and in that union finding greatest peace.3 In keeping with 
his intention to confine the testimony of religious experience within 
its own proper bounds, he thus cannot see the need, or the justifica-
[ tion, of an infinite God. 
' 
The practical needs and experiences of religion seem to me 
sufficiently met by the belief that beyond each man and in 
a fashion continuous with him there exists a larger power 
which is friendly to him and to his ideals. .All that the 
facts require is that the power should be both other and 
larger than our conscious selves. Anything larger will do, 
if only it is large enough to trust for the next step. It 
need not be infiilite~ it need not be solitary. It might 
conceivably even be only a larger and more godlike self, 
of which the present self would then be but the mutilated 
expression, and the universe might conceivably he a collection e ---of such selves, of different degrees of inclusiveness, with 
i !1. James, The Varieties of Religious Experi~, pp. 514-515. 
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no absolute unity realized in it at an.1 
James has hereby dared to submit and support such a threatening 
idea as that of' a limited God~ This is the basis of' his pluralistic 
universe. He rejects the absolute :rronists, in their failure ·to account 
! 
~or all the facts of' human experience with consistency. The monists 
objected that God could not be finite. But James held that a God 
' 
' orthy of' the name must be f'ini te. 2 
He of'f'ers his pluralistic concept of' the universe as the only 
tenable solution. Such a villew is often called polytheistic, but this 
· ives of'f'ence, so he suggests not using 1it. However it is called, its 
ortance remains secure. A consistently thought-out monistic uni-
· erse suf'f'ers f'rom serious perplexities, including nthe mystery of' the 
rfa11 1 namely, of' reality lapsing into appearance, trugh into error, 
erfectioh into imperfectionj of' evil, in shortj the mystery of uni-
determinism. u3 The only escape that James can see is to 
that the "superhuman consciousness 11 however vast it may be, 
; as itself an external environment, and is thus f'ini te. 1 "The line of 
The line of least resistance, then, as it seems to me, both 
in theology and in philosophy, is to accept, along with the 
superhuman consciousness, the notion that it is not all-
embracing, the notion, in other words, that there is a God, 
but that he is f'~ te, either in power or in 1m ow ledge, or 
in both at once.n 
I! T: Ibid., P• 515. 
:L James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 125. · 
i Ibid.' p. 310. !. 
. Ibid., p • 311. 
I 
I 
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To suggest that God is li:mi ted in power, a devastating suggestion 
!for some theologies, is not to leave God entirely helpless and impotent. 
Indeed, it need not detract from his awe-inspiring position in the uni-
[verse. An essential feature of God, ac.cording to James, is that he be 
!conceived as the deepest power in the universe, and further that he 
:must be coneeived under the form of a mental personality. A power not 
, 
i ourselves, 'Which not only makes for righteousness, but means it, and 
.which recognizes us.1 
God may be thought of as providing the possibilities as well as 
! the actualities of the universe and carl-ying on his own thinking in 
those two cateogires just as we do ours. rrchances may be there, uncon-
·trolled even by him, and the course of the universe be really ambigu-
ous; and yet the end of all things may be just what he intended it to be 
\from all eternity."2 It is here that James introduces his famou~ anal-
ogy of the chess players. God, as the expert player in the game, knows 
:all the possible moves of the novice, but he camot foresee exactly 
rwhat any one move of his adversary will be. Despite this, he knows 
:in advance how to meet each move by one of his own which leads iii the 
direction of victory. 
Such a view preserves God's power and goodness, as well as our 
kreedom of will. The Creator may have decided to lead things to a 
I 
!certain end, without deciding upon all the intervening steps. The 
realization 
i 
of some possibilities would be left open, that is, would 
I r· James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 
2. William James, The Will to Believe (New York: 
1897), PP• 180-181. 
P• 122. 
Longmans Green ~d Oo., 
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only be determined when the instant of realization came. Such a God 
I 
:would be admittedly limited in knowledge, and in certain powers, but 
his essential nature would be secure.l 
This notion of God as limited, th~n~ is the characteristic ingre-
.dient of James's explicitly formulated theology. This, coupled with 
pis idea of God as personal in some sense, gives rise to the caaim that 
~e is a great but not infinite edition of the sort of thing found in I 
I 
the human self. 
By such a theory, man 1 s free will is preserved and the responsi-
i 
; ility for evil is removed from the perE\'on of God. To limit him thus, 
as has been shown~ does not decrease from his "Goodness," but rather 
increases it by absolving him from responsibility for hating caused ! 
; n 1 s suffering. He cannot help it, though he is constantly trying. 
is effort to overcome evil with the help of man will be discussed 
a subsequent chapter. 
~· ~., p .. 182. 
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ii~ .._ Hastings Rasliaa1l 
Hastings Rashdall is ~other thinker led by reason of the evil 
! that is in the world to belief in a limited God. For Rashdall, as .for 
; 
I James, the only basis .for judging good and bad is found in human ethi-
cal judgments; it is a matter of human e:xperience and understanding of 
experience that leads man to judgments of value and ethics. 
Rashdall thus derives the ground for belief in the existence of 
God :from his concept of morality. The etllical judgments at "Which man 
arrives then point to a higher morality. 
An absolute Moral Law or moral ideal cannot exist in material 
things. And it does not (we have seen) exist in the jjijnd of 
this or that individual. Only if we believe in the existence 
of a Mind for which the true moral ideal is already in some 
sense real, a Mind which is the source o:f whatever is true 
in our own moral judgements, can we rationally think of the 
moral ideal as no less real than the world itself. Only so 
can 1\!9 believe~in an absolute standard of right and -wrong, 
which is as independent of this or that man t s actual ideas 
and actual desires as the facts of material nature. The 
belief in God, though not (like the belief in a real and an 
active self) a postulate of there being any such thing as 
Morality at all, is the logical presupposition of an •objec-
tive' or absolute Morality. A moral ideal can exist nowhere 
and nohow but in a mind; an absolute moral ideal can exist 
only in a Mind from. which all Reality is derived. Our moral 
ideal can only claim objective validity in so far as it can 
rationally be regarded as the revelation of a moral ideal 
eternally existing in the mind of God.l 
From this it follows that there must be Will as well as Thought 
: ih God, in so far as human Morality is a revelation. There must be 
some representation of the end toward which Reality is moving. Accord-
: ing to Rashdall, then, the very idea of Morality implies action direc-
! 
I . 
1 ted towards an end -which .. has val"Q,~. This poses a God working toward 
i 
· l. Hastings Rashdall, The TheorY of Good and Evil, Vol. II (Oxford; 
i The Clarendon Press, 1~07 5, p. 212. 
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a more perfect order, and, in this effort, His creatures are called 
I 
i upon to help. 
Rashdall .faces the very real difficulty posed by evil. If the 
world is rational, how can we account .for the presence of so much which 
our moral consciousness tells us is evil, and 'Which, if his view of the 
relation between the human consciousness and the divine be right, we 
may suppose to be evil also .for the :rl!ind of God? He does not claim to 
be able to show erqpirically the necessity of evil in the world, But, he 
says, nrf God be rational, we have a right to suppose that the world 
!must c~ntain more good than evil, or it would not be willed at all.Jt1 
:Rashdall points out that some of what w~ call evil in this world is the 
i 
!condition of good. But, he continues, Hit is .not so much the existence 
as the nature and quantity and distribution of evil in the world that 
1 ~mnstitute the difficulty ... ~ • so much smaller a measure of it in 
\quantity and quality would have sufficed, so far. as we can see, to sat-
!is.fy these necessities. n2 Evil may well be necessary, but not so much 
• evil. And, .for the purpose of promoting good, a much more effective 
,distribution might be proposed, by which a much greater good would 
result. 
I He offers no solution at this point. The only thing one .Can .fall 
I 
back upon is the moral consciousness. This, taken in connection with 
i 
the theistic argument as a whole, causes us to believe that the world 
I 
· ust-have an end, that that end is good, and that the good is in 
• Hastings Rashdall, Philosophy and Religion (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1910), p. 85 • 
• Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, p. 236. 
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. principle the same good of which, in the moral judgments of the developed 
f 
i moral nature, we have some kind of revelati.on.1 He asserts that the more 
i profoundly we believe in the ultimate rationality o.f things, "the more 
strongly we shall be disposed to believe that for each soul born with the 
consciousness of a moral ideal an end is realized which will on the whole 
! make it good for that soul to have lived. 112 On this basis, evil is 
I accepted as existing because it is a necessary means to the greatest 
· good that the nature of things makes possible. It becomes necessary to 
• admit that: 
God 1 s ends can only be attained by the adoption of means which, 
in themselves and abstractedly ;considered, are barl., and which 
remain bad from whatever point of view we look at them,; however 
much they may be justified as invo5l:n:gg less evil on the whole 
than the omission of those me~ns and the non-attainment of the 
ends to which they are means. 
Limitations are thus seen to be operating here. 
As has been shown, the limitations must be conceived of as part 
!of the ultimate nature of things~ And the ultimate nature of things 
meands, for the idealist, the nature of God. Bun Rashdall is reluctant 
to call God finite. He holds to a certain qualified omnipotence, and 
insists that there be no misrepresentation of the view he holds. On 
jl. Ibid.-. 
--·· 
:2. Ibid.' PP• 251-252. ! 
·3. Ibid.' p. 344. 
"' \ ') 
I 
' I possesses all the power there is, that He can do all things that are in 
I 
their own nature possible. n~ 
Despite any limitation which must be ascribed to God, he must 
'' ' 
still be regarded as working out a plan which is essentially good for 
his creatures and himself. 
All ·that we are· concerned with from the ethical· point of view 
is that God should be regarded as willing a Universe that is 
the best that seems possible'to a Mind to whom all the possi-
bilities of things are known, and who wills the existence of 
all that is actual because he knows it to be best.2 
God causes all the good that his own nature makes it possible for him 
to cause. 
The power possessed by the ultim~te will of realizing its ideal, 
: while greatly transcending that of the derived will, still falls short 
' 
of a power to produce good only, with no evil at all. This is not to 
say that evil makes for good. For the sake of morality, it can never 
be admitted that evil makes a better universe possible. 
On .our view the bad may be the necessary means to a greater 
good, but it remains bad all the same. The Universe without 
that act (had its absence been possible or in accordance with 
the actual nature of the world) would have been better still.3 
Evil does not make for good, but is a condition out of which good must 
be evolved. The end of the universe is then the evolution of souls in 
which what our moral consciousness pronounces good shall be more and 
more realized. 
The outcome which we must suppose to be the end of the universe 
11must be the greatest good on the whole, the greatest good that is 
possible; that is to say-, the good that necessarily flows from a Will 
l. Rashdall, Philosophy and Religion, p. 83. 
2. Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, pp 237-8. 
3. Ibid., p. 243. 
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of perfect goodness "out limited power.n1 Again,. evil is explained in 
terms of a theory of ffthe union in one and the same Being of absolute 
Goodness "With limited. Power"2 and all the implications which such a 
unli:on involve. The Goodness can be infinitely projected, and is only 
held back by its lack of sufficient power. 
In ascribing evil to some author, Rashdall still endeavors to 
absolve God of responsibility, and place it upon man. God is respon-
sible for the evil that men do, but not in such a way as to clear 
men of complete responsibility for their own actions.3 ::~~"·-
In a sense, ••• man is the sole author of evil; for man 
alone wills the evil otherwise than as a means to the true 
good. God wills the evil only as a means to the good, and 
to "Will evil as a means to the good is not to be evil, or 
to will evil as such, or to exhibit any defecto:f Goodness.4 
It is not within the nature of God to will anything except for the ulti-
mate good. But man, lacking perfect Goodness, often wills to do acts 
which in no way lead to good. 
But still, it may be objected, a bad act is done only because 
there is a bad soul in the world. And that soul is made or caused by 
God. Then why should God make bad souls, and so cause bad acts to be 
done? The only answer Rashdall can offer is found in the theory that 
there is the union in one and the same Being of absolute Goodness with 
limited Power which causes this apparent discrepancy. "A better Uni-
verse is imaginable, but a better Universe is not possible, because 
l. Ibid., p. 290. 
2. ~·' p. 341. 
3. Wright, p. 387. 
4. :Ra.·shdall, The Theory of ••• , p. 345. 
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I 
' 
43 
nothing is r~a.lly possible but what is or will be actual. ul It must 
simply be accepted that whatever happens in the world is really willed 
by a self-conscious Spirit :for the attainment of ends which He knows 
to be essentially best.2 
Rashdall comes to the point of admitting that it would be more 
satisfactory to be able to say that God was in some sense the cause of 
evil. 11That is only to say that I could wish the UniYerse were better 
than it is; and~ if God be the God who ±svreY.eaJ.ed $o us by our moral 
consciousness, He wishes that too.uo However, given the world as it is, 
God, with man, is wo:rking it out to a better state• J 
iii. Leonard Trelawney Hobhouse 
Leon~d Trelawney Hobhouse offers a theory of a limited God also, 
but his theory takes a much different :form :from that of James and Rash-
dall. The basic reasons for arriving at such a position are, however, 
the same. 
Evolution is the keynote to Hoghouse 1 s view of all phases of the 
universe. In tracing the evolution of morals as connected with reli-
gion, he sees a tendency to a;;'more and more acceptable explanation of 
evil in the world. From the barbarisms of primitive cults, to the 
extreme demands of justice on the part of the God of early monotheism, 
to the happy combination of ethics and religion in the ideal of' Chris-
tianity, progress can be discerned. But even here, there is room :for 
a higher level of understanding. There is a wide gulf between God and 
l. Ibid., P• 341. 
2. ~., ·p 
3. ~., p. 34.5. 
i man. flMan is of composite nature and therefore corrupt. God is pure 
Spirit, ••• the highest and best t~t is known to man. nl 
Although God in his justice has provided a means whereby the 
gulf may be spanned and forgiveness of sins obtained~ still there is 
the unreconciled .fact of sin, and thus evil.- Even in the tradtltional 
-
view, Hobhouse finds the seeds of belief in a finite God: 
/ 
God is the creator ·and sustainer o.f 1;4ings. As creator he 
makes the world out of nothing, and he makes man in his 
image. He endows his creatures with existence and they 
become in a manner s~parate from him, and· in so .far as they 
have independent e:x:istenc~s must be held to limit him. He 
is no longer all that is. · 
At the same time, as sust.ainer~ it is only in him that things have 
. 
existence. His 'Will cl.lone is the cause o.f all that happens. So~ with, 
God as sustafner; what of evil? With the assumption d:lf the uncondi-
tional omnipotence of God, "the problem of evil at once becomes urgent, 
and we tbuch the very heart o.f all ethico-religious theory. The Pla-
tonic doctrine that God is good and, as good, can be the author o.f no 
evil, may be regarded as. the corner-stone o.f all ethical religd!on. n3 
How, he asks, can this be fitted in with the dogma of omnipotence 
accepted by monotheism? 
Hobhouse points out such weaknesses o.f the v.arious common answers 
to this dilemma and drives on .for a more consistent answer. At this 
point, the dotZtrine of .free w.ill, for Hobhouse as for James, implies a 
l. L. T. -Hobhouse; Morals in Evolution (London: Chapman & Hall, 1951), 
P• 496. 
2. ~., p. 498. 
3. ~' p. 499. 
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limitation on the power of God. ·On any conception of free will, the 
ultimate responsibility of the Creator of evil remains. So, the limi-
tation of God arising from :man 1 s free will carries with it a .further 
limitation in answer to the problem of evil. nEven if all evil resulted 
from the wicked will of man, yet it is God -who made man and gave him 
freedom to act as he would. Th®, though omnipotence is limited, its 
responsibility is not abrogated.nl 
The possibility of a further limitation is opened by reference to 
the need of evil for man r s higher development. To suggest that God 
could not, without implanting seeds of suffering, produee the nobler 
race of strong men, is to place a limitation on the creative power of 
God. 
It may be that to strive and fall, to endure suffering in 
ourselves and even the sight of it in those whom we love, 
is an unavoidable condition of moral growth, but if this 
is so, it is as much as to say that there are laws and con-
ditions in the ,iritua.l world vfuich omnipotence it.self 
cannot infringe. 
The omnipotence o.f God is thus made untenable by a critical exam-
ination of these theories in light of what man knows about himself and 
his development. Hobhouse is hereby forced to reject the notion of 
an all power.ful God. In keeping with his pattern of thought, he offers 
as a substitute an evolutionary theory: 
For an omnipotent Disposer we are compelled to substi tu. te 
the evolutionary conception o.f a Spirit striving in the 
world of experience with the inherent conditions of its 
own growth and mastering them at the cost of all the blooli 
1. ~·, P• 505. 
2. ~., P• 5o6. 
that stains the pages of: histQry, and all the unremembered 
tears that bedew the lone des~rt places o£ the heart.l 
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This Spirit he describes as a Mind working out the ;\lrpose of the 
uTniverse. As has been shown, this Spirit is subject to conditions and 
i achieves its fuJ..J.. growth only by mastering them. Under such a view, 
! progress is ma<;le onJ..y d:h so far as the conditions of: life come more and 
more under the dominion of Mind. 2 The extent of evil. is ttthe measure 
of the incompleteness of the order actually achieved by Mind in the 
world. ,.3 Physical evils result from the impact of natural causes which 
intelligence has not yet subordinated to its ends on the spiritual order, 
' while moral eviLresuJ..ts from the clashing of purpose in minds which have 
not yet been brought li!nto an organic lr.ty. 4 Physical evil then becomes 
the outcome of the blind operation of mechanical forces, and moral evil 
the result of: the pursuit of: partial ends without regard to the effect 
on others.5 
To the objection that even on this view, catastrophes, diseases, 
! and suff:ering. are dif:.ficuJ.. t to reconcile wi. th a plan in which every-
thing at bottom is to serve some purpose in the harmony of: the whole, 
Hobhouse replies "that he is not suggesting that every event is good.; 
l. Ibid. 
-
2. Ibid., P• 634. 
3. L. T. Hobhouse, Development and Purpose (London-: MacmiJ..J..an and Co., 
Limited, l9l3), p. 367. 
li· Hobhouse, Morals in ••• , p. 634. 
5. Hobhouse, Development and ••• , p. 368. 
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but that every event proceeds from some combination o:f .forces, each o.f 
which is somewhere or sometime necessary .for the fulfillment o.f. the 
world-purpose. "The evil that these .forces may work is the price that 
is paid for them, and that this price bas to be paid is the proof o:f 
the limitation o.f purpose, not o.f its non-existence.nl 
Such a conception o:f a conditio~ed purpose as constituting the 
core of the world-process, is thus held by Hobhouse. The pattern is 
one o.f a self-conscious evolution o:f humanity, and therein is meaning 
and an element of purpose for the historical process Which has led 
up to it. 2 His concept of Mind is in keeping with his organic conception 
of evolution, for the central mind itself must be regarded as under-
going development. 
I.f it is conditional as well as condition, it must be limited 
by the constitutive elements of the Real unity, and in so far 
as it has not dominated them, must be dominated by them •••• 
Thus, Humanity, in the sense which the best Positive writers 
have given the·word, Humanity as the spirit of Harmony and 
expanding life, shaping the best actions of the best men and 
women, is the highest incarnation known. to us o:f the divine.3 
I Assuming then one concludes that God is, if asked -what He is, one can 
t reply rtGod is that of which the highest known embodiment is the dis-
~incti..;;..e spirit o:f Humanity. n4 
This is Hobhouse' s vlew of God (here described in terms of Mind, 
or Humanity) as limited, unable to prevent evil, but gradually overcom.-
1. Ibid. 
2. Hobhouse, Morals in • . .., p • 637. 
3. Hobhouse, DeveloEment and • , p. 371 • 
4 .. Ibid.~ 
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ing it. He conceives the world-process as a development o.f organic 
harmony through the extension of' control by Mind operating under mech-
anical conditions Which it comes by degrees to master.1 
1. Ibid., p. 372. 
,. 
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CHAPTER rt 
A FINITE GOD AND EMERGENT EVOLUTION 
AS AN ANSWER TO THE 'PROBlEM OF EVIL 
Evil is a name for something that is actually present in human 
experience. It is pointless to speak of it as illusory, or as a dis-
guised good. Such aversions may confuse the terminology, but they do . 
not dispose of the fact. 
So, given evil, what can be said of its state? There are three 
possibilities. It may be static--neither increasing nor decreasing, 
but simply maintaining itself. It may be increasing; gaining momentum 
by its own increase. Man, in his relation to man, may be becoming more 
and more inhuman; physical evils may be compounding themselves. Or, 
, evil may be on the way out, and may someday no longer exist. Man may 
be a~vancing lin his ~.ssault against moral evil, as well as physical. 
evil, toward the eventual. liquidation of ani trace of evil, that is, 
-
toward a perfect state of harmony. 
James, Rashdall and Hobhouse affirm this las"t:,~· theory. They 
believe that by a process of emergent evolution evil is slowly being 
overcome. This, whether as a flself-eonscious evolution of humanity", 
or a higher development of the moral consciousness, is in the realm 
of possibility and actually being effected. 
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1. The Impact of the Theory of Evolution 
With the reading of a pap.~r on t:9-!' ?;:;.~ .c>£ ?peS,i~~ before the 
Linnaean Society of Lqndon in 18.59 a new era in thought was opened Wide 
:for all who ventured to deal with the controversial subject. 
i 
Charles Darwin was not the first to advance a theory of evolution. 
Lamarck,_ St. Hilaire and Spencer had introduced the idea earlier, causing 
' mild shocked reactions.1 Indeed, this idea, like nearly all ideas, can 
, be traced back. to the Greeks. Heraclitus and Anaximander had suggested 
that animal species were mutable. The Stoics and the Epicureans had 
likewise outlined the possibility of such a theory.2 But it was Darwin 
who developed the idea in such a way that science, and indeed the "Whole 
world of thought, could no longer ignore the specter of evolution. His 
was a detailed and richly documented theory of the actual mode and pro-
1 
cess of evolution by means of' natural selection, preserving favored 
species in the str11ggle .for lif'e. It was Darwin who received the wide 
publicity for a theory that was not original with him • 
. Herbert Spencer wallowed f'or decades in egolutionary 
speculation of the boldest sort without arousing one-
tenth the scandal, excitement, loyalty, hatred, and ani-
mosity. Darwin's great investigation was not only central 
to scientific thought in many .fields. It placed him dir-
ectly athwart almost every great issue in philosophy, ethics, 
and religion. The old questions of necessity and free will, 
mechanism and spontaneity, matter and spirit, realism and 
nominalism, relativism and the absolute were :faced all over 
again ang argued in a new light because of The Origin o.f 
$pecies. 
1. Durant, p. 354. 
2. William Irvine, Apes, Angels, and Victorians (New York: McGravr-Hill 
BooR Company, Inc., 1955), pp. 83-84. 
'3'. Ibid., p. 83. 
And so, evolution became the keynote of' philosophic thought of the 
19th century, with biology as its backgrouna.1 
The Darwinian theory contained many defects and diff'iculties,2 
but these on~ served to increase interest in and speculation about 
that phenomenon of' evolution. It thenceforth was taken into account by 
every philosophy, if' not incorporated into that philosophy. 
2. Belief' in a Finite God and a Theory of' Emergent Evolution 
Go Together 
A beli~f in emergent evolution could be held in connection wi,th 
belief' in a God who has no limit in power. It may be that t1ae world is 
getting better and better all the time, and that God planned it this 
way, although he had power to arrange it another way, for example, 
static with a balance of' good and evil, or, at once and forever, perfect. 
Hence, eme.rgent evolution and a God with limited power do not necessarily 
go together. But some writers have been careful to point out that a 
theory of' emergent evolution ~ call for a f'ini te God. If' He is not 
limited in power, and could have. made the world perfect without intra-
ducing evil, then he is limited in love because he did not do so. 
The more satisfactory view, as chosen by James, Rashdall and 
Hobhouse, is o.f' a God limited in power. The world is not per.f'eet. 
But God is all loving. Therefore, he must not be able to tolerate 
the active force of evil.. He must be working to overcome evil, in 
keeping w.i th his great goodness. .And 
1 
the fact that evil is not yet 
l. Durant, P• 355. 
2. Wright, p. 323. 
.,.. ~ .. ::- ~ 
..... ~---·---
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overcome indicates that God ha.s limitations in power. 
The presence of evil in itself reflects God1 s finitude--he was 
evidently unable to create a perfect world without some factor of 
evil. And the fact that evil has not yet been liquidated.lfurther indi-
cates God•s limit in power. But the faith is that He is not so limi-
ted that he cannot eventualJy overcome it. 
3. The Development of this Joint Theory 
i. William James 
God and man have business with each other, and that business is 
i the working out of an ideal universe. This is the approach William 
James takes to the relation be"tvlreen God and man, and to an evolutionary 
process toward perfection. This God is not absolute; does not possess 
infinite power, but is nthe ideal tendency in things, believed in as a 
superhuman person "Who calls us to co-operate in ll.is purposes, and who 
furthers ours if they are· worthy. nl 
The need .for a working relationship between God and man is thus 
established: 
God is the natural appellation, ~or us Christians, at 
·.least, for the supreme reality, so I will call this higher 
part ·or the universe by the name of God. We and God have 
business with each other; and in opening ourselves to his 
influence our deepest destiny is fulfilled. The universe, 
at those parts of it which our personal being constitutes, 
takes a turn genuinely .for the worse or for the better in 
proportion as each one of us .fulfills or evades God t s 
'demands.2 
James never ceased to believe that a divine power is contributing toward 
l. James, A Pluralistic Unive_:r;s~-,. :P.NW-24. 
2. James, The Varieties of ~e~ig~ous ~~erierice, p. 507. 
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the progress of this world and of humanity.? 
This God James is describing_, however, is not an immanent God. 
He is external, other than man. But he is not completely other. God 
and man hold enough in common to be in -tbuo.h with each other. lfin 
whatever other respects the divine personality may differ from ours or 
resemble it, the two are consanguineous at least in this, -that both 
f) 
have purposes for which they care, and each can hear the otherrs call.nc. 
James r s God, then, is one who really exists, who is a personality 
outside our ovm and other than us, a power not ourselves and more power-
ful than we are, but not a distant, enthroned majesty. Ile:. is one willing 
to descend into the dust and degradation to join us in our daily strug-
gle against the powers o:f evil, ». • • a God "Who lmows and appreciates 
our ideals, and who collaborates with us ahd we with Him to bring about 
their realization.u3 
James never defines exactly what he would consider to be the 
rightly ordered condition of the universe, nor what ideals would be 
realized in such a state. Flournoy, in his important book on the phil-
osophy of William James';: points out that to do so would have been 
against his anti-dogmatic attitude. One cannot absolutely describe 
human conduct, for each moral situation is new and unique and the moral 
1. Th. Flournoy, The Philosophy of William James (New York: Henry Holt 
and Company, 1917), pp. 132-133. 
2. James, The Will to :Sel~~ye~;~p:::~122. 
3. Flournoy, pp. 147-148 • 
•' . 
. --. _,_ 
·:.·--; :,_ ~ :~-- ~- ~-. -- ·' 
agent must in the last analysis judge and act on his own account. 
! James will only refer to this ideal state as one 'Which would give us 
the loftiest and most complete satisfaction.1 
,Flournoy includes this co-operative salvation idea as one o.f 
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Jamests .four doctrines in which his pervasive sentiment of the serious-
ness of life comes out. These are: ftthe liberty o:f man, the reality o:f 
evil, the existence o:f God, and the possible salvation o.f the world 
(that is to say, in the :final triumph o:f good) by the collaboration o:f. 
man with God."2 
God and man are related in such a way that James holds that God 
may in fact "draw vital strengb~ and increase o:f very being from our 
:fidelity.n3 But the relationship is not one-way. It is rather a mat-
ter o.f mutual dependence. If God needs man, so much more does man need 
God t s active participation in his struggle. Such a God must be able to 
function on man 1 s level. 
In this real world of sweat and dirt, .it seems to me that 
when a view of things is tnoble 1 , that ought to count as a 
presumption against its truth, and as a philosophic disquali-
fication. The prince o:f darkness may be a gentleman, as we 
are told he is, but whatever the God of earth and heaven is, 
he can surely be no gentleman. His menial services are needed 
in the dust o:f o-qr huma.p trials, even more than his dignity is 
needed in the empyrean. 4 
The other forces which man trusts to co:-operate with him in e.f.fect-
ing these ideals are at least his :fellow men, in the stage o.f being Which 
our actual universe has reached. The ~urpose "will be realized only on 
1. Flournoy, rl'b:e~=~ii~losophy o:f William James, p. 125. 
2. Ibid.' p. \15. 
- \ 
3. James, The Will fug _Bel.ievev ~l.6l. 
4. James, Prggmatism, p. 72. 
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• condition that each member of the universe co-operates in it and does 
··his individual best. nl E:v:en tl:l,ough a person ·may not have felt indivi-
.. 
dual religious promptings, Flournoy warns ''do not for that reason con-
I elude that you and God are not to work tog~ther. He needs each of us 
to co-operate for the ultimate triumph of good~ for the welfare of the 
world. tt2 £! must co-operate in response to the great challenge to all 
I men. 
I It is the common struggle of man and God that gives meaning to the 
i~ sweat and blooa and tragedy of this life. In .fact if this life is not 
. a real fight in which someth?-ng is eternally lost or gained for the uni-
.verse, nit is no better than a game of private theatricals from which 
:one may withdraw at willecn3 But, he says, it feels like a real fight, 
as though there were something. really "wildtf in the universe which we 
are needed to redeem, with our idealities and fai th:fulnesses. And our 
nature is adapted for this half-wild, half-saved universe. 4 
The forces of evolution can be seen operating here as providing 
elements of challenge. In writing about evolution in general, James 
1
, points out the importance of two distinct factors: the individual who 
bears the power of initiative and origination, and the social environ-
1 ment, with its power of adopting or rejecting this individual and his 
I 
;gi'i'ts. "Both factors are essential to change. The community stagnates 
Witlkoiit the impulse of the :individual. The impulse dies away without. 
i1. Flournoy, IDhelBfiilosophy of Wllliam James, p. 130. 
I 
2. Ibid.~ pp. 214-215. 
3"' James, The Will to '.eelie1fe::;) .. p~,l61. 
'4. Ibid. 
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the sympathy of the community. nl The lesson of this analysis forms a 
most stimulating appeal to the energy of the individual. 
In the evolving universe of Hobhouse and Rashdall, there is a 
' qualified determinism. They seem quite confident <that a better world 
:is:, assuredly_, to come about. There is this assurance, although the 
exact conditions of the evolvement are not determined, and cannot be 
known to man (or even God) before they come about. In James this is 
not the case. He goes to some pains to distinguish between "possi-
,\bili tyn and tlfact. n He first poL11.ts out that "the great religious 
• difference.:lies between the men who insist that the world must and 
I --
1 shall ~' and those who are contented, with belie~g that the world 
\ 
lmay be, saved. The whole clash of rationalistic and empiricist reli-
\gion is thus over the validity of possibility.n2 
He then examines what this means to lrim. as a pragmatist. He holds 
\that when the .conditions are entirely present, the· salvation of the 
~orld is no longer a possibilit,r,.but a fact. But ~m±s is not the act-
! 
'ual case; perfection has not so far appeared. Therefore he must say 
1
that pragmatically salvation is possible. 11Some of the conditions of 
,the world r s deliverance do actually exist. The more of them theine are 
existent, the fewer preventing conditions you can find, the better-
i 
[grounded is the salvationts possibility, the more probable does the 
'fact of the deliverance become. n3 So he can affirm possibility, but 
l. Ibid. , .p. 232. 
2. James, Pragmatism, p. 282. 
k. 
I 
Ibid., pp. 284-285. 
~ 
I 
• • 
l not· certainyY:. Flournoy describes the situation: 
I . Cle1:1-rly, i:f the past and the present gave us complete 
I satisfaction it would not occur to us to wish for a dif-
ferent future. Surely it is because the actual world 
disappoints us so sorelyl;aand forces upon us so much sor-
row and confusion1 that we feel the need of transforming and improving it. . · · 
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! This is pragmatic pro0f that· salvation lies in the area of possibility, 
! 
I 
. not certainty. 
i 
James goes on to say that it would contradict the very spirit of 
; life to say that our minds must be indifferent in questions like that 
I . 
'· 
'I of the world1s salvation. As Flournoy puts it, "The sense of being able 
I 
i 
; to contribute toward such a betterment, and with some hope of success i:h 
: the end, thus becomes the secret spring of all our activity as reasonabll~ 
! 
i 
1 and moral beings. n2 
I 
James describes his position as mid-way between that of the pessi-
mist who thinks the salvation of the world impossible and the optimist 
! who considers this salvation inevitable. Meliorism is the name given 
this mid-way point of view. TfMeliorism treats salvation as neither neces-
saey.' non impossible. It treats it as a possibility, "Which becomes more 
. and more of a probability the more numerous the actual conditions o:f 
! salva:.tion become. n3 
He declares that the world can be made better. The possibility 
of its salvation is not merely an abstract, conceptual one_, but a concrete 
one. Flournoy says it is guaranteed by two facts: "first, that we are 
: l. Flournoy, p. 122. 
12e~• 
3. James_, Pragmatism, p. 286. 
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here -with our ideals" ready to strive for their realization" and to 
intervene effectively in the world 1s destiny; second, that this world 
!~ is not a rigid and finished block, but an aggregation o.f indep~ndent 
1 
elements, where. nothing prevent.s us from separating out and eliminating 
what we find evil, so that all trace of it shall.disappear in that final 
world toward which we .strive .• 111 
As experience reveals it, then, the destiny of man is not to be a 
passive observer in a universe in which he can accomplish nothing, but 
it is rather to assert himself by actively ~osing his ideals. This 
:presupposes that the course· o:f events should be susceptible to real inno-· 
i 
: vations, while evil" instead of being inherent in the universe, can be 
l 
\expelled from·it, as one chance element.among others.2 
This evolutionary working out operates in the area of social change 
to some real, though not revolutionary, degree. James describes it thus: 
Even the dogged resistance of the reactionary conservative 
tO changes which he cannot hope entirely to defeat is justi-
fied and shown to be effective. He retards the movement; 
deflects it a little by the concessions he extracts; gives 
i-t a resultant momentum, compounded of his inertia and his 
adversariest speed; and keeps up, in short, a constant lateral 
pressure, which, to be sure, never heads it round about, but 
brings it up at last at a goal far to the right or left of 
that t3 which. it would have drifted had he allowed it to drift 
aRne. 
This ffdog~ed resistance" serves to keep the vital forces in. the universe 
moving. 
As another ground for expecting a better world order, James refers 
1.. Flournoy, p. 1?:3. 
2. ~·, p. 124. 
3. James, The Will to ••• , p. 245. 
59 
i to his ndisbelieftt that our human experience is the highest form of 
tl experie~ce extant in the universe. He p.ses the relation of our dog or 
I cat pets to the whole of human life as analogous to our relation to the 
; whole of the universe. He suggests that njust as many of the dog's and 
cat' s ideals coincide with our ideals, the dogs and cats haze daily liv-
ing proof of the fact, so we may well believe, on the proofs that reli-
\ gious experience affords, that higher powers exist and are at work to 
i save the world in ideal lines similar to our own. nl 
Tha challenge of the melioristic standpoint appeals to James's 
, nhealthy-mindedn vitality, or red blood, as a welcome challenge. Flour-
I .. . 
l noy calls this feature of James t s moralism its lfheroic character. n2. One 
'·gathers that man, in his eyes, does not feel himself to be really living 
! . 
except in the envigorating atmosphere of determined struggle. 
When things are made too easy for us we soon lose our spirit. 
There are in each of us reserves of energy 1'Vhich comfortable 
and humdrum life fails to call out, but 1Vhich are sometimes 
awakened at the touch of the exceptional or the tragic. Then 
it is that we feel really ourselves)3 
, James presents a hypothetical situation in which man could choose whether 
' he wants to take up this challenge: 
i 
Suppose that the world's author put the case to you before 
creation, saying: I .1 I am going to make a world not certain to 
be saved, a world the perfection of which shall be conditional 
merely, the condition being that each several agent does its 
awn 111evel best. tt I offer you the chance of taking part in 
such.a world. Its safety, you see, is unwarranted. It is a 
real adventure, with real danger,yet it may win through. It 
is a social scheme of co-operative work genuinely to be done. 
i 
I 
1 1. James, Pragmatism, p. 9QO. 
2. Flournoy, p. 127 .. 
13. Ibid. 
I 
i 
I 
Will you jo:in the procession? Will you trust yourself and 
trust the other agents enough to .face the risk? 11l 
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In answer to this forceful question he says that most o.f us would accept 
the o:ffer because of a "healthy-minded buoyance in most of us which such 
' a universe would exactly fit. tt2 The real pragmatist, he says, is willing 
to live on a scheme of uncertified possibilities -which he trusts, willing, 
, if necessary, to pay 'with his own person .for the realization of the ideas 
· which he frames. 
Although, as· a meliorist James can only affirm possibility, he does 
:make reference to a real assurance, .found in most religious men. He finds 
:. that they believe that, 
not only they themselves, but the whole universe of beJmgs to 
whom the God is present, are secure in his parental hands. 
There is a sense, a dimension, they are sure, in.which we are 
all saved, in spite of the gates of hell and all adverse ter-
restrial appearances. God t s existence is the guarantee of an 
ideal order that shall be permanently preserved. This world 
may indeed, as science assures us, some day burn up or .freese; 
but if it is part of his order, the old ideals are sure to be 
brought elsewhere to fruition, so that where God is, tragedy 
is only provisional and partial, shipwreck and dissolution are 
not the absolutely final things. Only when this f'arther step 
of faith concerning God is taken, and remote objective conse-
quences are predicted, does religion, as it seems to me, get 
wholly free f'rom the .first immediate subjective experience, and 
bring a real hypothesis into play. 3 
This beliei' he classifies among what he calls ttover beliefs" which 
;each man holds. And he later suggests that faithfulness to these over 
\beliefs may ~actually help God in turn to be more e:ffectively faithful 
!to his own greater tasks. tt4 Here then is the role of man help:ing God 
I 
<l. James, Pragmatism, P~• 290-291. 
j2:. ~-, p. 291. 
i 
I :3. James, The Varieties of ••• , pp. 507~508. 
!4. ~., p. 509. 
~. 
I 
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ana God helping man in the stupendous task of realizing the ideal 
universe. 
I 
! ii. Hastings Rashdall 
For Hastings Rashdall, our concep·hion of the goodness of God is 
an inference from our own moral consciousness. It is from this that 
,our notion of a world potentially, though not actually, good derives. 
i 
! 
The ultimate principles of our moral judgements, e. g. that 
love is better than hate, are just as applicable to God as 
they are to us. Our conception of ·the highest good may be 
inadequate; but we certainly shallnnot attain to greater 
adequacy, or a nearer approach to ultimate truth, by flatly 
contradicting our own moral judgements~l 
\So, since we prefer love over hat~; and desire good to replace evil, 
~IGod must have the same inclinations, but to a much highe~ degree. 
From here, then, an explanation of evil must be fo1md. If we apply 
!these judgments o:f value to the universe as we know it, we see that every-
\ 
:thing in it is not good. But surely God wants everything to be good even 
as we do. Still, evil is here. Rashdall never tries to deny this fact: 
I 
For my own part, I unhesitatingly say, 1Pain is an evil, and 
sin is a worse evil, and nothing on earth can make them good. ' 
How then are we to account for such evils in a Universe -which 
we believe to e~ress the thought and will o:f a perfectly 
righteous Being? 
I 
iThe only answer he can offer here is that these evils are conditional-
I 
'a means to· a greater good. Whatever evil exists in the world must be 
I .· . 
rderstood to exist as a necessary means to the greatest good that the 
1. Hast:).ngs Rashdall, Philosophy and Religion (I'lew York: Charles Scribner 1 s 
· Sons, 1910), p. 68. · 
j 
2. ~., p. Bo. 
1) 
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Such a view appeals to a concept of morality that consists in 
striving. A theology which represents God too as striving is an inspi-
ration to the stmggling soul~. But it is not a hopeless, endless stri'V=-
]):ig;:~ it is a striving for an end which lfwill hereafter be realized in 
i such a measure as to make the striving r~asonable."3 This is a project 
I 
:\ 
in which the eo-operation of man is essential. It is that which is 
good in man, uniting with the perfect goodness of God, which will even-
tually overcome evil. 
The end which we must suppose to be the end of the Universe 
must be the greatest good on the whole, the grecttest good 
that is possible; that is to say, the good that necessarily 
flows from a Will of perfect goodness but limited_ power. 4 And human duty must consist in co-operation With that Will. 
This is n.o sham warfare with an evil which is really good, but a 
real warfare -with a real evil, a struggle in "Which we have the ultimate 
power of the universe on our side, but one in which the victory cannot 
be won without our heJ.p, "a real struggle in which we are called upon 
fo be li tera.:lJ.y fellow-wo~kers with God. 1~5 
1 
This; then, 
of here and now. I -
is an immanent God-one actively involved in this world 
.According to Rashdall, a God tfbeyond good and evilJt 
• Rashdall, The Theory of • • • , p. 236 • 
. • Rashdall, Philosophy and Religion, p. 82. 
. • Rashdall, The Theory of • • • , p. 2 53. 
~., p. 290. 
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can be no proper object of worship to men who wish to become good, just 
and merciful. If the cosmic process is indifferent to such ethical con-
siderations 1'we had better make up our minds to defy it, whether it call 
itself God o~ not. nl 
ThSe~a:n·.la~.,man . actually loves God, he promotes the moral ideal• 
The two may be equated: devotion to the moral ideal or true good of 
Humanity, and loving God, in the sense that to do one is to do the other. 
This devotion ~o the ideal receives a tremendous reinforcemen~r,a~onal 
and emotional--by being identified with the love of a person in whom our 
highest ideal is realized, and on whose side we are called upon to con-
tend in a real battle for the realization of that same ideal in others. 
That the love of God may be implicit in all reverence for the 
moral ideal and all true love of Humanity, even when :the 
thought of God is not consciousl2present to the agent's mind, 
I should be the first to assert. 
· According to the position held by Rashdall, God may not have unlimi-
; ted power, but he does possess all the power there is. This concept of 
[ God he finds consolatory and more stimulating tban a belief in a God who 
! can do all things by any means and who consequently does not need our 
' 
1 help. llPain, sin, and other evils must be regarded as necessary inci-
' I dents :;_,;_ the pr11aess by which the divine Will is bringing about tbe 
I greatest attainable good of all conscious beings. n3 It is a real strug-
1 gle, in which we are existentially involved. Life is not a simple liv-
, I ing out of days along the line of least resistance. Rather, it is per-
i-
r 1. Rashdall, Philosophy and Religion, p. 105. 
2. Rashdall, The TheoEY of ••• , pp. 267-268. 
3. Rashdall, Philosophy and Religion, p. ll9. 
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I 
vaded with a spirit calling to the highest in man to strive for the good. 
In his discussion of ev0lution Rashdall maintains that, before there 
can be any morality there must be a moral capacity. He says that the idea 
:of morality is an ~ priori or immediate idea in the same sense in which 
the idea of quantity or cause is ~ priori.l 
Our moral ideas are gradually developed in exactly the same 
sense, and in exactly the same way, as any other of the 
capacities of the human soul, and this forms no more reason 
for doubting their va21dity than in the parallel case of the 
multiplication table. · 
So, on Rashdall 1 s view the moral capacity is not evolved in any way 
!different from the capacity for the idea of space. But this does not 
~rule out the posjjdibility of moral progress. Evolution does not oper-
;ate for Rashdall to originate morality because the capacity had to be 
l there already. It is the co-operative struggle of God and man with 
'the assurance of gradual progress that constitutes the idea of emer-
1gent evolution :for Rashdall. It is evolution in the sense of prog-
ress, as against a static or regressive theory. 
Progress can thus be made by way o:f an evolutionary process; 
Rashdall simply wants to make clear that the moral capacity is not a 
ly-product o:f evolution. Such a qualification does not remove him 
really very much from the position o:f James and Hobhouse. The impor-
[taut idea which they hold in common is that a higher order is evolving. 
I 
I 
The universe is not static; it is moving on toward a real per-
faction. Such perfection is achieved, bit by bit, inso:far as each 
l. Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, p. 356. 
2. Ibid., p. 357. 
,G., 
') 
'J 
I 
I 
; human bellig serves his moral consciousness, and unites with God to 
effect a greater harmony. 
A form of determinism and a belief in immpDtality are important 
' aspects of Rashdall 1 s theory. Rashdall calls his position determinist, 
; or, strictly speaking, self-determinist, as against fatalism, indeter-
i minism or libertarianism. According to his theory, the essential ele-
! ments in any act are original character and environment. This allows ! . 
! for the possibility .of prediction, which is basic to his definition of 
I determinism: 
Actions a:rrel£he;:;nehessary:onesru:er:,tryf~10riginal character and 
environment. Original character and environment being the 
same, the act could not have been d.:i:fferent. Given an 
adequate ~owledge of both, the act could always have been 
predicted. 
:But this does not prevent change-of action, because character must 
i 
1 
always include undevelop~d possibilities. He points out that determin-
ism is not inconsistent with conversion or change of character, or that 
such a change can only take place in consequence of some new featUre in 
the external environment. 
Change of character, whether gradual or sudden, is as easily 
explainable on Determinist grounds as continued identity of 
character. It is not only the outward behaviour that may 
change, but the character also, though doubtless some char-
acteristics of the man must remain even after the most start-
'ling of such changes if' he is to remain the same man. Not 
only his acts, but his motives, his emotions, his principles 
of action may become quite different from what they were 
before the hit~erto latent capacity of his nature was called 
into activity. 
r;·Ibid., P· 303. 
~ ,. --
i 2. Ibid. ' pp. 304-304. 
i 
' 
When Rashdall says that a man 1 s acts are causes he does not mean 
!that they are caused in the same way and sense in which mechanical 
levents are caused by one anoth~r. 1 Rough predictions as to a man's 
i" 
future conduct may be made on the basis of past acts. But the act is 
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not caused by previous acts; it is caused by the same self which caused 
'the previous acts. Past.acts never reveal the whole of the man's char-
i acter. Strict predictability is not possible becaus;: the whole nature 
!of the self is not revealed, to anything existing in the universe, 
! 
!that is, to self-observation or human observation, though (we may 
I 
I 
suppose) not unrevealed to the.universal mind. 2 
Thus the possibility of strict prediction of future conduct, so 
resented by opponents of determinism, is greatly limited. Ro:om is 
still left for apparently sudden new departures which look as though 
• they were unconnected with everything in the previous life) 
I 
I 
' Rashdall makes clear that this determination is not from the out-
I side, is not a mechanical coercion impo~ed from -w:ithout, constraining 
ran to act irt a way in which he does not desire to act. 
1
rather self-determined. And so it becomes a developing, 
i 
All acts are 
and opening 
·iout of what is already within man, in the context of his particular 
i I environment. 
This theory is applied also to God w:fW is likewise determined 
l. Ibid. j p. 326. 
!2. Ibid., P• 348. i 
3. Ibid., P• 349. 
-
..... 
• 
from wi~hin. It is this condition of inner determination that has 
given rise to the world as it is. t~ better Universe is imaginable, 
I 
I in the world is really willed by a self?conscious spirit for the attain-
ment of ends which he knows to be essentially best} 11Wha t 'We have a 
right to affirm, is that the Universe must be moving to an end which 
is good on the whole in the sense that its existence is better than 
:its non-existence, a good which is worth the evil that it costs."4 
i 
I 
i And he even goes so far as to suggest that the ultimate extinction 
not beyond what we may hope. ,,5 i of moral evil ltis 
'I 
I 
!I 
The future, then, is not totally plank, not totally without form; 
:it is subject to fashioning, with good as the ultimate outcome. 
I 
If 
'then the end is assured, it maybe objected that human effort or lack 
ilo~ .effort does not matter; that good will ultimately win out no matter 
:what man does. But he asserts that his position has no such depressing 
effect on even the most strenuous moral effort. 
To my own mind it is far more inspiring than most Indeter-
minist theories of the Universe. Itrepresents God as the 
ultimate source of all being in the Universe that has a 
beginning, and as directing the world-process towards the 
goal which shall attain as much of the highest ideally 
f· Ibid., P• 341. 
'2. Ibid. 
I 
14. ill£•, P• 351. 
'I J:'• 
:;> Ibid. 1-
!3. Ibid. 
conceivable good as can become actual. He calls upon the 
higher spiritual beings who have derived their existence 
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from Him to aid in this process. It is a ·real, and not a 
merely apparent, struggle to which their God-derived moral 
consciousness invites them. The evil is a real evil~ though 
an evil destined to be more and more diminished. The rapidity 
with which and the extent to which the evil will be diminished 
and the good attained really does depend in part upon human 
effort. It iS true doubtless that God knows how much he will 
aid; but we do not know, and no human being e:v.:er can know until 
he has acted. .And there is nothing in tllese considerations to 
para~ze, but everything to quicken and reinforce, all those 
desires and aspirations which determine the extent and manner 
in which we shall actually be pennitted to take part in the 
great process of world-redemption.l 
Immortality is introduced as a necessary consequence of the :illlper-
feet life, the suffering arid hardships to which man is subjected in this 
li life. He points out that the ethical importanc·e of the idea of God is 
:I 
!i prior to and independent of any belief in the idea of a future life. 
But still, when the idea of a righteous God has once been accepted, the 
!.' idea of immortality seems to follow as a corollary. 
I 
If any one on a calm review of 
1
the actual facts of' the world t s 
history can suppose that such 4 world as .ours could be the 
expression of the will of a rational and moral Being without 
the assumption of a future life for which this is a discipline 
or educatd.on or preparatory stage, argument would be useless 
with him. 2 
!i He goes on to point out that for those who are convinced that the world 
'· 
.1 has a rational end, and yet that life as we see it cannot (in i tseli) 
be that end, a pypothesis of Immortality becomes a necessary deduction 
from their belief in God. 
It is our moral ideal, which we attribute to God:; which calls for 
1. ~·' p. 355. 
1 2. Rashdall~ Philosophy and Religion, p. 77. 
t 
belief in immortality. 
The character and ultimate purpose of the divine .Mind is 
revealed to us~ however inadequately or imperfectly,. in 
the moral consciousness; and the moral ideal which is thus 
communicated to us makes it reasonable for us to expect, 
for at least the higher of the dependent or created minds, 
a continuance~ or their individual existence, after phy-
sical death~l 
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It might be sate to assume that, once perfection is reached, suCh 
immortality will be no longer necessary for the souls introduced into 
the perfect state. They will not be subjected to evils for which ·exten-
ded life is necessary to overcome them. But, the rational end is as yet 
unattained, so Immortality appears a necessary counterpart with this 
view of God. 
The point of Rashdall's theory, then, is that God causes bad souls 
to appear as a means to an ultimate good, a good which is Unattainable 
without them. The bad is willed, or 11permi ttedtt ~ by God as a means to 
2 
a greater good, without on that account ceasing to be really bad. 
He supports the theory with the assertion that ~hatever happens in the 
world is really willed by a self-conscious Spirit for the attainment of 
the ends which He knows to be ess~ntially best. u3 
iii. Leonard TrelawneyHobhouse 
L. T. Robhouse sees the order of the universe as a ffslowly wrought 
dominance of mind in things~ n4 This he calls the central fact of evo.lhtion. 
1. ~., P• 119. 
2. Rashdall, The Theory of ••• , p. 341. 
3. Ibid., 
4. Robhouse, Morals in ••• , p. 637. 
I' ~ 
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ire speaks o£" self-conscious evolution o£ humanity, wherein is found a 
,meaning and an element o£ purpose £or the historical process which has 
~~ed up to it .. 1 This sell-conscious evolution di££ers £rom previous evolu-
ltion in having a purpose towards which it steadily makes its way, giving 
!it a new element. 
Slow at £irst, the development gathers speed with growth, and £in-
ally settles ·into the steady movement o£ a germun£olding under 
the direction o£ an intelligent knowledge o£ its powers and o£ 
its li£e conditions. The goal o£ the movement, as £ar as we can 
£oresee at present, is the mas:beiry by the human :miil.d o£ the co~­
ditions, internal as well as external, o£ its lile and growth. 
;aere the tworking out r process sounds like a human project. But Hobhouse 
igives a wider meaning to his concept o£ rMind, thus involving what is called 
! 
God as the £ocal point o£ this process~ The evolution o£ Mind is the dom·-
linating princ:iple in this world, and this Mind is not simply a collection 
I I . 
iof human minds, but an overriding £orce, active in the entire universe, 
: e££ect:i.ng the work usually ascribed to God. 
Thus Humanity, in the sense which the best Positive writers have 
given to that word, Humanity as the spirit o£ harmony and expand-
iilil.g li£e, shaping the best actions. o£ the best mem:.ancl women, is 
the highest incarnation known to us o£ the divine. If, indeed, 
we come to the conclusion that God is, and are asked what He is, 
we may reply that God is that o£ which the ~ghest known embodi-
ment is the distinctive spirit o£ Humanity. 
There are certain conditions within which creation must take place, so, 
1
£or an omnipotent disposer is substituted the evolutionary conception of a 
' Spirit striving in the world of e:xPerience with the inherent conditions o:f I 
'its own growth and mastering them.4 This Spirit, which is £ound in the 
:l. Ibid. 
·2. L. T. Hobhouse, Mind in Evolution (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 
1915), pp. 442-443. 
13. Hobhouse, Development and Purpose, p •. 286. 
~4. Hobhouse, Morals in Evolution, p. 5o6. 
I 
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1 highest Humanity, operates as Mind, an organizing intelligence. 11M:ind 
I 
I grasps the conditions of its development that it may master and ~e 
1 use of them in its further growth." l 
Hobhouse rejects a purely teleolQgical view of the world process, 
in which design is apparent and progress is sure and continuous. "The 
theory of continuous automatic inevitable progress is impossible. n2 
Progress is not a simple, automatic process that goes on by itself 
according to some law or an inherent tendency of things. 
The struggle for existence is not as such a force that makes 
for betterment, and in fact in human history we find epochs 
of progress followed by l0ng ages of stagnation or retro-
gression. If tb.e evil of the world overthrew the doctrine 
of unconditioned creation, the disorders and reactions of 
history are no less fatal to a:purely teleological doctrine 
of the world process.3 · 
There remains, as a possible explanation, a spirit subject to conditions. 
and achieving its full growth only by mastering them. If this view is 
correct, progress is made only in so far as the conditions of life come 
more and more nnder the dominion of Mind • 
.According to such a view, evil is not a positive force, but merely 
the automatic result of the inorganic. Physical evil results .from the 
impact on the spiritual urder of forces of nature or physical conditions 
which intelligence has not been able to subordinate to its ends; moral 
evil .from the clashing of purposes in minds which have not been brought 
into ClJ1 organic unity. 4 
l. ~., P• 637. 
2. Leonard T. Hobhouse, Social Evolution and Political Theory (New York:t 
Columbia University Press, 192?), p. 160. 
}. ~9.l:?.h:?.~E1~.L Morals in • • • , p. 634. ' · 
4~ Ibid. 
. 
1 
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God, as Mind, as Spirit, is immanent in the human situation. Hob-
house does not suggest an external God who is watching the human mind 
struggle to overcome adverse forces; but rather a God Ustriving in the 
world of experience."l 
If this general conception of evolution is correct, the further 
development of society will follow a very different course .from its his-
tory so far, in that it is destined to fall within the scope of an organ-
izing intelligence, and thereby be removed from the play of blind f'orce 
to the sphere of rational order. 
Such a change must be gradual .and attended w.i.th many setbacks. 
The very ideas "Which are to direct it are yet in their infancy. 
Yet the social self'-consciousness which gives them birth, 
arrived at as it is by a blending of' the moral, the scientific 
and the religious spirit, is f'or us the cuJ.minating fact of' 
ethical evolution. But such an end can only be a beginning. 
Mind grasps the conditions o.f its development that it may 
m:tster and make use of them in its fUrther growth. 2 
So the progress is not automatic; it is dependent on further con-
curren.t conditions "Which may work against it and arrest it. It does not_, 
so to say, represent a straight line to -which the movement of humanity 
is confined and along which it is always mo-ving. If The study of actual 
evolution in tbe past does not suffice to tell us with certainty either 
what ought to be or what will be, but it tells us what niay be."3 With 
whatever halts and back turnings,_ all we can say is that it is a dir-
ection in which humanity, or at least a large part of humanity, has 
actually moved a considerable distance, and is at present moving with 
1. ~., p. 506. 
2. ~., p. 637. 
3. Hobhouse, Social Evolution ••• , p. 158. 
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' greatly increased speed.l This stage of self-conscious development may· 
be expected to conplete itself and prepare the way for a still higher 
and wider spiritual synthesis as previous stages have done. "Mind as an 
' organising principle -will continue to grow indefinitely. But so stated 
the inference is hasty and precarious. A curve cannot be produced -with 
any certainty unless its l-aw is known, and we have not as yet been able 
; to trace such a law for the advance of mind. rr2 
I 
As seen on the level of the person~ the individual organizes his 
'life with a certain measure of freedom in so far as he is able to utilize 
past experience and bring within his mental grasp that in bis future which 
vi tally concerns.him. He fails in so far as his grasp is too na.:rr.vow or 
as his purposes a:re not accurately adjusted to his real needs. As seen 
from the highest stage, we assume there a mind of such wide scope that 
these sources of failure are kept under control. ~e assume that it has 
as a basis to work upon a complete understanding of the conditions of 
its awn development, and that its purpose is a harmony of the elements 
of value discoverable in the millions of lives that make up its unity.rr3 
The working out of tbis process issues in a harmony. What applies 
to particular individuals applies also to principles, tendencies, modes 
of action. So far as these conflict, they tend to cancel out. So far 
as they harmonize, they maintain one another. Hence within any system 
orking on the whole in co-operation, the harmonious tendencies survive 
1. Hobhouse, · Develonment and • • • , p. 207. 
2. Ibid., P• 281. 
Ibid., pp. 282-283. 
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and the harmony becomes more and more co:mplete.1 Thus harmony is not 
only a product of development, but a cause of aevelopment. It is, so 
to say, a cause of itself, for it tends to extend its sphere and deepen 
its hold. But here again, the process is not automatic. Whe living be-· 
~gs;, ironcbheili' structural parts, tend to maintain themselves and it is 
on~ ~ selection and modification that they are brought into harmony 
w:lth one another. 2 
Progress then is an evolutionoof harmony. ' This is a self-
furthering process in the sense explained, but is none the 
less subject to arrest by causes of discord within or with-
out. In aJ.l but the lowest stages it is effected by con-
scious correlation, and its development depends on the ex-
tension of the sphere of conscious control.3 
Thus God and man both operate to bring about this dominance of 
mind in things, on different levels, but toward the same ultimate goal. 
The process of evolution upon this earth then appears as the working 
out in concrete form and on this relatively small stage, of the vaster 
process which we dimly conceive as constituting the essential life of 
the world.4 
I 
) 
CID\PTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. Critical Considerations 
Several Issues discussed by James, Rashdall and Hobhouse are here 
raised for further critical discussion. 
i. William James 
Regarding James, the matters to be discussed are: possibility 
versus certainty; ~he o1lallenge of evil; and 6ptimism. 
Possibility versus certainty.--According to James's analogy of 
the chess players, God is in control of the ultimate outcome of the 
universe. He is in a position to insure the final end he has in mind, 
by making those moves which contribute to his goal and counteract the 
ones that detract from it. The realization of some possibilities would 
be left absolutely to chance, would be only determined when the moment 
of realization came; others would be contingently determined, their 
decision would have to wait till it was seen how the matters of abso-
lute chance fell out. "But the rest of the plan, including its final 
upshot, would be rigorously determined once for all. nl Of one thing 
he says the creator oould be certain, 11that is that his world was safe, 
and that no matter how much it might zig-zag he could surely bring it 
home at last.n2 
1. James, The Will to Believe, p .. 182. 
2. ~· 
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However, ~ Pragmatism he carefully distinguishes between ffpossi-
bility" and 11fact" and holds that all we can say·is that the world may 
be saved. Here he can affirm possibility, but not certainty, on the 
basis that when the conditions are present salvation becomes a fact, 
and since salvation is not a .fact then it can only be a possibility. 
1 
This seems to contradict the point of his chess game analogy, accord-
ing to wb..ich James should be able to say that salvation is more than 
possible or probable. It is certain of becoming a fact, on the basis 
-which he has already established of God 1 s control. In his e.f.fort to 
, qualify as a meliorist he ~as apparently forgotten his chess game. 
When he cites the testimony of religious men he once again .finds 
! the assurance which he had denied. He even goes so far as to say that 
tfGod 1 s existence is the guarantee of an ideal order that shall be per-
, •1 
manently preserved."~· 
When James speaks o.f God as "the ideal tendency in things" he is 
again lacking certainty. Here he is faced with ·,;I!Jie problem confront-
ing the religious naturalis;ts. However, he does not accept a natural 
theology, pointing out that t'we of the nineteenth century, with our 
. 
evolutionary theories and our mechanical philosophies, already know 
nature too impartially and too well to worship unreservedly any God o.f 
whose character she can be an adequate expression. n2 A natural relig-
ion seems to him to carry an inevitable bankruptcy.. Still, there is no 
assurance that the "ideal tendency" is strong enough to survive. The 
ideal tendency may be (and surely app~ars to be) in competitiol;). with 
i 1. James, The Varieties o.f Religious Experience, pp. 507-508. 
' 2. James, The Will to Believe, p. 43. 
\ 
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same non-ideal tendency which could defeat it. 
uttered in the face of someone -whose "dogged resistance" has just worn 
out. This theory speaks to the fact of evil, but it seems weak in light 
of the distribution of evil. James fails to meet the difficulty caused 
by the quantity and distribution of evil, the difficulty which bothered 
Rashdall most. Jamests theory of challenge and response,. struggle, 
gradual growth, and eventual triumph would be satisfactory if there was 
an equitable distribution of evil. Evil might be accepted as providing 
for the struggle that yields better men, but it is distributed in such 
a way that this doesnrt work out. Those who need challenge are often 
left unchallenged, While others are challenged beyond endurance. Many 
never get a chance to face the challenge--are victimized before they get 
started. 
As RashdalJ. points out, there is simply too much evil to be accounted 
for as necessary to proper development of man. "A much smaller measure 
of it in quantity and quality ~ould have sufficed, so :far as we can see, 
to satisfy these necessities. n2 James never seems to cope with this 
problem raised by the oversupply and unjust distribution of evil. 
1. James, The Will to Believe, p. 61. 
2. Rashda.ll, The Theory of Good and Eyil, p. 236. 
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Optimism.--I£ Camus seems to hold out too little hope £or mankind, 
I it :may be objected that James holds out too much. His tthealthy-minded 
:
1 
vitalityu is certainly stimula:ting and challenging £or those who are 
1 
·healthy-minded and vi tal. But what o£ the weak, the hungry? Do they 
I 
I rise to the challenge in the way he expects? Or ~they do so? And 
could he have the audacity to put his hypothetical casJto a su£fering 
child, a child who dies before it reaches an age when it could under-
stand the proposition being made by the author of the world. 
ii. Hastings Rashdall 
The following are three points raised by Rashdall which merit 
further examination, omnipotence, determinism, and itrunortality. 
~shdall wishes to retain the term omnipotence as applying to God. 
But in doing so he admits of several limitations with which and within 
which God must operate. First, he says that if it is no limitation of 
God not to be able to change the past because that is ·unmeaning, then, 
in the same way, it may be no limitation that he should not be able to 
evolve highly organized beings without a struggle for existence. But, 
as Hobhouse points out, this implies a limit on God 1 s creative power. 
God was unable to create a perfect world without instrumental imper-
fections. Perfection is only possible b~ way of imperfection. Rash-
dall says H.from the point of view of perfect knowledge, these things 
might. turn out to be just as unmeaning as .for God to change the past. n2 
l. James, Pragm.ati~, pp. 290-291.· 
2.·Rashdall, Philosophy and Religion, p. 82. 
\j /) 
o· 
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But from the point of view of our limited knowledge it is not unmeaning .. 
Just because we have never seen a universe where man could be perfect 
i without the necessity of evil does not indicate that such an arrange-
ment is impossible. This is a limitation to which we are confined by 
our experience, but God need not be tied to it if he has no limit in 
his power, if he is omnipotent. That God carm.ot change the past is a 
different proposition than the one that he could not have chosen a more 
perfect pattern at the time of creation. 
A second limitation which Rashdall applies to God involves human 
limitations in vision and eXJ::Brience. According to Rashdall, the only 
sense which we can intelligibly give to the idea of a divine ·&nnipo-
tence is that God possesses all the power there is, and that he can do 
all things that are in their own nature possible. But it would be 
wrong for us to suppose that the only things that are in their own 
nature possible are those which we have seen actual. This would limit 
God strictly to Z!!!. vision and experience. 'Why cannot there be things 
possible, which we cannot see, or have not seen, actual, but wbich one 
who has not our limited vision can see as possible or can make actual? 
Rashdall then claims that "God is infinite because He is limited 
by nothing outside His own nature, except what He has Himself' caused.ul 
If God is infinite how can he be limited, when infinite means unlimited? 
This statement admits two limitations, each of which destroys God's 
infinitude. If God is limited by something inside his own nature this 
does not make it any less a limitation; it still does not grant him 
1 .. Rashdall, Philosophy and Religion, p .. 85. 
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unlimited power. And Rashdall further admits that God is limited, out-
1 side his own nature, by what he has caused. 
God is limited, but only by His own nature and by the existence 
of other beings which owe their exis·tence to that nature and 1 
such a limitation is one which involves no ethical :tmperfection. 
He goes on to say nwe can still call Him Omnipotent in the sense that He 
possesses all the power there is. "2 This is not omnipotence in the dim~ 
ension of 111llllirn:i.ted in power. 11 To have all the power there is is not to 
have a limitless reservoir of power; it admits of a limitation. Further-
more, if God delegated any power to his creatures then he must not have 
all the power there is. If the traditionalists admit these limitations 
and still call God omnipotent they are likewise contradicting themselves. 
Rashdall tries to absolve God from responsibility for evil by 
pointing out that man alone wills the evil otherwise than as a means to 
the real good. But he has no satisfactory an~r to the objection that 
God made the bad souls that do the bad acts. Furthermore, there appear 
to be evils that cannot be traced to man, for which God must answer 
11if we admit the existence of~ moral evil whatever which the indivi-
dual 1 cannot help t, that evil is really for him determined, and springs 
in the last resort from that ultimate constitution of the Universe 
which to the Theist is identical with the nature of God. n3 · 
Rashdall falls back on the phenomenon of the union in one and 
the same Being of absolute goodness with lind:ted power. This strange 
l. Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, p. 347. 
2. Rashdall, Philosophy and Religion, p. 83. 
3. Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, p. 347. 
·• 
-~·. 
union may be an excuse but is not really an answer. God is left res-
ponsible for man's suffering because he could have refrained from 
i c.:ueating at all if he knew that some bad souls would result. 
God is as much responsible for evils which He foresees 
will certainly flovr from the use which some individual 
will actually make of the freedom with which He has 
endowed them, as a human being would be responsible for 
the consequences if he placed' loaded firearms in the 
h.;mds
1 
of people who would be sure to connnit murder with 
them. 
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If we have already granted that God is limited in power, we are faced 
here with a further limitation, either in lmowledge or in love.. If 
he did not know that bad souls would appear he is not omniscient. If 
he knew this and still created, his love is limited by his lack of. 
power. Rashdall points out that his opponents admit this limitation 
even as his determinism does. "Not to be able to cause good without 
the possibility of evil is as much a limitation as not bo be ~ble to 
cause goodwithout the certainty of evil."
2 
Rashdall still holds to 
the view that God knew what he was doing and that the end of the uni-
verse must be the greatest good on the whole which will somehow justi-
fy any pain incurred by any creature along the way. ·"Whatever happens 
ih the world is really willed by a self-conscious Spirit for the 
attainment of ends which He knows to be essentially best.n3 
When Rashdall states th~t "nothing is really possible but what 
. . 
is orJ'iill be actualn4 he carries his determinism to apply to Ged as 
1. Ibid., P• 343. 
2. Ibid., P• 344. 
3. Ibid., p ... 341. 
4. Ibid. 
well as man.. God can do only what he is doing or shall do. There 
are no alternatives. God is tied to one way of action and cannot 
'! depart from it. So, instead of several possibilities there is only 
one, whlich then is got just possible, but certain. Rashdall has 
given a special meaning to the word possible. Where Webster offers 
the definition 11may or may not occur1t, Rashdall would have to change 
to to nshall occur. tt He does not appear justified in retaining the 
term, because he has completely violated its meaning. His determin-
ism here seems stronger than he is ready to admit. 
illnm.or%afuii;t'j;~-~ecording to the view taken by Rashdall, innn.or-
tality is necessary because of the suffering of this life. Also, 
because, if we assume that the world has a rational end we can F.See 
that this life is not that end, therefore it must be to come. 
When Rashdall found it necessary to adopt belief in a God 
limited in power he did not feel that this had a devastating effect 
on God's greatness. He held that God is the ~ost powerful being 
there is and can thus have tons of power without needing to have 
unlimited power in order to retain his status as God. A similar 
point might be made against Rashdall 1 s view of immortality. Man's 
existence need not be unending in order to provide for those things 
Rashdall is concerned to provide for by his belief in innn.ortali ty. 
Perhaps two million years would suffice for man to receive recom-
.pense for his hardships and for the rational end of the world to 
evolve. We have as much reason for believing in or not believing 
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in endless existence as we have for accepting or rejecting the notion 
of a God with unlimited power. 
f\, 
iii. L. T. Hobhouse 
.Among the ideas presented by L. T. Hobhouse, his notion of an 
organizing intelligence, and his tendency toward humanism are here 
raised for discussion. 
Organizing intelligence.--In the writings of Robhouse, God is 
pictured as a spirit subject to conditions and striving to bring the 
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conditions of life under control. Moral evil results from the clash-
ing of purpose in minds Which have not_yet been brought into organic 
unity. These minds have will, and certain delegated power, and have 
chosen to be unruly, have resisted being brought into the proper 
unity. But what about physical evils? These, he says, result from 
the impact of natural causes which intelligence has not yet subord-
inated to its ends in the spiritual order. If this is the case, then 
things must have been reall~ out of hand at the beginning, or at the 
time of creation. On this view chaos was the first order of existence, 
and what we see in the physical world today is the result of centuries 
of the evolutionary process. Brightman suggests that at one time 
there were probably no individual selves at all but only "the ongoing 
of inorganic mat tern. 1 The Given is gradually controlled by God's 
will, and evolution is the result of this controlling process. 2 This 
appears similar to the view taken by Hobhouse. According to Hobhuase,· 
not only the human element by reason of the free will granted, but 
also the physical element is outside God 1 s· control. In the case of 
1. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion, p. 367. 
2. Ibid. 
"" \ 
' the physical element the unruliness is probably not due to free will 
or delegated power, but is simply something God never has been able to 
cope with, and is only now gradually coming to dominate. 
Hobhouse says that if his conception of evolution is correct the 
further development of society will :follow a very different course from 
its history so far, in that it is destined to fall within the scope of 
an organizing intellig.ence and thereby be removed from the play of 
. l T blind force to the sphere of r~tional order.. his implies that soc-
iety has not so far been within the scope of an organizing intelli-
gence--but has merely been subject to the play of blind force. Such 
a theory of a trend of social development in various stages of society 
might be compared with the social dynamics of Karl Marx~ Neither of 
these views is free .from what Sorokin calls the 11linear lobsession r of 
the nineteenth century. 112 These,.he said, and all the other social 
and humanistic sciences 11made much of having allegedly 'discovered' a 
3 host of eternal historical trends with their stages of development." 
Such.a view is open to all the criticism levied against a linear theory.4 
If we assume that society has·made no progress to date, as Hob-
house sugge~ts, this paralyzes his evolutionary theory up to the pre-
sente Evolution has evidently not operated so ~ar. And Hobhouse fails 
explain why the organizing intelligence should begin to operate now. 
l. Hobhouse, Morals in Evolution, p. 637. 
2. Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis (Boston:: 
The Beacon Press, 1951), p. 283. 
3. Ibid., p. 285. 
4. Ibid.' pp. 287-291. 
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Humanism.-Hobhouse sounds like a humanist when he says that 
humanity is the highest incarnation known to us o:f the divine. But he 
is not really connn.i tted to support humanism any more than the others. 
'When he says that God is 11that of which the highest lmown embodiment 
is the distinctive spirit . o:f Humani ty"1 he leaves it open as to what 
else God might be. Hobhouse is merely taking the highest in man and 
! saying this is the closest we come to God. This does not limit God 
to being merely the highest we know o:f humanity. It leaves open the 
real possibility that he is much more. 
When he speaks o:f C-od as spirit, this God is more than mere 
human ideals. God is a spirit which man becomes aware o:f through the 
religious consciousness. I:f man does not become thus aware, he at 
lease sees evidence o:f this spirit mn history. 
Hence, i:f the mind does not directly through the religious 
consciousness become aware of its relation to a greater 
Spirit, it does have to recognize the existence of condi-
tions appropriate to the operation of such a Spirit, and to 
admit in its ow.n history a process in~ich such conditions 
are working out their natural results. 
Hobhouse is here very close to Rashdall, in ascribing to God a 
higher development of the best we know in man. · Rashdall found this in 
the moral consciousness of man; Hobhouse in the spirit of humanity. 
l. Hobhouse, DeveTopment and Purpose, p. 371. 
2. Hobhouse, Mind in Evolution: pp. 371-372. _ 
~· 
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2. Critical Comparison 
I 
The thinking! of James, Rashdall and Hobhouse meets on several 
fronts. Their vieks are sometimes parallel or complementary. At 
other tilDes they Jfveal weaknesses in each other. The foll_,g com,-
1 
parison deals wit~ four cases in which their various ideas deserve 
1 further cri tic.al domparison. These are: the question of irrnnanence; 
creative scope; u~timate responsibility; and internal evidence. 
Immanence.-~Of the three men, James claims belief in an external 
i 
God. And yet, wi~h closer scrutiny, it appears that all three regard 
I 
Godl s relation to lman in a similar way. Both Rashdall and Hobhouse 
aElmi t to an immanJnce doctrine, but they and James are closer than 
I 
the terminology wJuld suggest~ 
I James describes God • s nothertt quality thus: ffGod r s personality 
I 
is to be regardedJ like any other personality, as somethli..Iil.g lying out-
1 
side of my own and other than me, and whose existence I simply come 
upon and find."1 lso God is external in the way that all other per-
i 
sonali ties are external. But, being God, he might be able to do more 
than these other tersonalittes. He might be inherent in every man, 
providing for an involvement between God and man, and man and man, 
I 
l'ihich would not b~ otherwise possible. Indeed, in religious experi-
ence we have evidrnce of this relationship between God and man. 
We have in the fact that the conscious person is continuous 
with a wilier self through which saving experienc€6 come, a 
positive pontent of religious experience which, it seems to 
me, is li~erally and objectively true as far as it goes. 2 
I 
1. James, The WilD- to Believe, p .. 122. 
2. James, The Var~eties of Religious Exp::rience, p. 505. 
I 
I 
I 
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Here, then, .thetpe~~onsms continuous with a wider self, which aclrnow-
1 
ledges a common gr0und. To go farther, though, he states: 
The furthet limits of our being plunge, it seems to me, into 
an altogether other dimension of existence from the sensibJe 
and merely I 1understandable 1 world. Name it the mystical 
region, or the supernatural region, whichever you choose. So 
far as ourlideal impulses originate in this region, we belong 
to i·t in al more intimate sense than that in "Which we belong in 
the visibl~ world, for we belong in the most intimate sense 
wherever o~ ideals belong.~ 
I 
So, although this ~y be an 1•other11 dimension, we belong to it more 
than to any dimenslon of our experience. 
I 
No matter in[ what sense God is other than man, still "each can 
hear the other 1 s ck111~2 , and God and man do work together to bring 
about the realizatlon of our ideals. Man and God do have a ground 
I 
for a relationshipjwhich is creative and productive. Perhaps, on 
I 
the basis of his Gpd as ''other than m.@ 11 , James would not agree to 
I I 
saying "God is a pbwer not ourselves but of "Which we are a partlf, or 
! . 
'.'in wbich we partilipate. 1: But to say this would not violate his 
theory of the rela[tion of God and man. Indeed, if God does draw 
strength and increrse of being from our fidelity, there must be 
grounds for a uni~he relation between God and manj·a further capac-
ity than is found ~etween other personalities~ Man and God are in-
1 
valved in a mutuaJ dependence, each ne,eded by the other for the 
realization of a c
1
ommon goal. 
Rashdall ~s in a similar way of the working relationship 
between God and 
1
. We are involved in a struggle in which we are 
1. trbid~, p. 506.1 
2. James, The Wil~ to Believe, p. 122. 
I 
I 
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I 
called upon to be ~ellow-workers with God. • God is actively involved 
in our world, pres~nt in our existence. God is affected by what we 
do, and we are aftcted by what he does. James has said the same 
thing. Rashdall wpuld consider a Godabove good and evil unworthy of 
worship. James sihularly affirmed a God willing to join us on the 
' level a£ dust and regradation in our daily struggle. Rashdall even 
goes to the ext~eJe of suggesting that we ought to defy God, if he 
is indifferent. Flor both, Godt s active participation and involvement 
with us are import~nt as stimulu and inspiration to us. 
Hobhouse' s +d is als~ ilmnanent, involved -.:i th man, "striving 
in the world of experience.rrl The individual human mind and the higher 
I 
Mind are part of ~!he same, so it is indeed important for them to remain 
I 
in contact with e~ch other. The nslowly wrought out dominance of Mind 
' in things~ calls :frr the help o:f individual human minds, as well as 
the highest Mind, br spirit of humanity. Thus, although James uses 
a different label ~or his position, the working relationship between 
God and man is simtl.larly described by all three men. 
I . , 
Creative scoke.--Concerning the scope of God's creative power, 
! 
Hobhouse seems to feal with this problem most adequately. He openly 
I 
admi:l>s that if suffering is necessary to develop the best man, this 
serves to conditiop the creative power of God. 2 To suggest that God 
could not, withouJ
1 
implanting seeds of suffering, produce the nobler 
race of strong me~ is to place a limitation. on Godts creative power. 
I . 
1. Hobhouse, Mora~s in Evolution, p. 506. 
I 
2. Ibid., p. 5o5. 
/ 
') 
I 
I 
If in no other waJ a moral order could come into being, or a man be 
i 
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made god-like, the~ God was limited in creative possibilities. God 
apparently could Jot make man perfect at the start, so he leaves this 
I 
unfinished task fgr man himself to try to complete. 
I 
Neither RasJdall nor James meets this problem as Hobhouse has. 
I . 
Rashdall does notjpretend to understand the need for evil. "To attempt 
I 
to show empiricaliy the necessi~ of evil in ~e world is a task which 
I for one have nol the smallest inclination to attempt."1 He admits 
I 
the possibility o+ a creative limitation, but still chooses not to 
i 
call it a limitatton of God, because it is not imposed from without. 
There are I necessities to which even God must submit. But 
they are :6.ot imposed upon Him from without: they are p3.rts 
of His omjl essential nature. The limitation by which God 
cannot attain His ends without causing some evil is a limi-
tation of I exactly the same na.ture5 If you say that it is 
no limitation of God not to be able to change the past, for 
the thingj is really unmeaning, then I submit that in the 
same way tt may be no limitation that He should not be able 
to evolve I highly organized beings without a struggle for exist-
ence, or to train human beings in unselfishness without allow-
ing the ekistence both of sin and pain. 
But, from the poiht of view of the suffering indi~dual, this ills no 
satisfactory answlr. Just because it is a limitation from within does 
not make it any llss real a limitation for the victims of this improve-
ment process. 
James neverl seems to recognize that the need for struggle which 
he is so excited rbout implies a limit in God's creative ability. He 
rejoices so in thr challenges of life that be at times ignores their 
l. Rashdall, The (rheory of Good and Evil, p. 235. 
I 
2. Rashdall, Phi~osophy and Religion, p. 82. 
I 
I 
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injustice. This is probably related to his failure to see the dif.fi-
. I 
culty caused by t~e distribution of evil. Assuming that everyone 
I 
I . 
needs to be challenged, and is challenged, and thereby becomes a more 
perfect being, thln everything is fair and square, and all the strug-
gles are justifie~. But if this is not the case, then the creation 
I 
of beings who couP,.d not grow without great suffering is the work of 
I 
I 
I 
a being limited i:O. creative ability .. 
! 
Ultimate RJsponsibility.-A striking similarity may be .found 
between Rashdallland Hobhouse in connection with the responsibility 
of God. While t~ng to absolve God from responsibility for evil, 
I both find him re~ponsible .for bad souls in the world, wbich do the 
evil. 
The cause why a bad act is done really is the .fact that 
there isla bad soul in the world. • • . Yet • • • we must 
admist also that the soul is made or caused by God: and 
one cann~t help asking oneself the question why God should 
make bad I souls, and so cause bad acts to be done.l 
Here Rashdall fales the problem and admits that he has no answer; he 
can only resort to ihe eXplanation of the =ion in one and the same 
being of absolut goodness with limited power. 
Hobhouse states the matter similarly: 
Even if ~11 evil resulted from the wicked will o.f man, 
it is Go~ who made man and gave him freedom to act as he 
would. [hus, though omnipotence is limited its responsi-
bility iis not abrogated. The concept~on of Free Will 
alone cohld not solve the difficulty. 
I 
1. Rashdall, ThJ Theory of Good and Evil, p. 240. 
. I 
2. Hobhouse, Morials in Evolution, p. 505. 
-e 
• 
I 
So, once again, Horhouse is driven to the doctrine of a conditioned 
creation. I 
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Internal evi~ence.--Each of these men in his own way arrives at 
I 
a belief in a "l"ror~d gradually becoming more perfect. None finds basis 
for this belief in external evidence, though. They do not weigh the 
content of evil, lral and physical, in the world .of today against that 
I 
, I 
of the world of 1200 A.D. Their criterion is in each case an internal 
verification. J~es finds it in his doctrine of pragmatism, Rashdall 
in the moral consdiousness, and Hobhouse in his evolutionary concept 
of the world. I 
According t1 the pragmatism of James, for a proposition to be 
true it must speJ to the conditions of our experience. 1 Relying upon 
what we know abouJ human nature, God, if he has greater goodness than 
man, must not be Jesponsible for evil.. But, faced with evil, we see 
that God is limitJd in power and unable to prevent evil, bu.t is very 
I I 
busy evolving a more perfect state. This preserves God's power and 
his goodness. I 
I Ro:t Rashdall it is the individual moral consciousness -which gives 
rise to belief in I ~he go9dness of God, and from there we get the notion 
I 
of a world potentially, though not actually, good. Since we prefer 
I . 
I 
good over evil God must have a similar preference. So, seeing the 
presence of evil ~e must understand it as existing as a necessary means 
to the greatest glod that the nature of things makes possible. 
I , Hobhouse sees all phases of the universe in terms of an evol-
1 
·1. James, Pragmat~sm, p. 72. 
I 
v 
i 
I 
I 
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i 
I 
I 
utionary process. I The evil we see in the world forces him to reject 
belief in an omnipltent God and substitute the evolutionary concep-
tion of a spirit striving in the world of experience.. He sees this 
I 
evolutionary patte~n as the direction in which humanity has actually 
I 
moved a great dist4nce and is at present moving with greater speed. 
I From this observation we '!nave a right to assume that the process will 
continue indefinijly, producing a higher and higher order of harmony. 
James and Ra1hdall apparently do not base any of their belief in 
progress on extern~ evidence; do not attempt a comparative study of 
j 
1 the incidence of, for example, earthquakes, during different periods 
of history. Theirlbelief relies upon an inner verification. Although 
I 
Hobhouse gives mort consideration to what he sees in trends in history, 
still it is an innfr affirmation of the powers man feels working that 
i 
furnishes the ground for the development of his theory of a limited Gdd 
I 
working out a high~r order. 
3. Conclusions 
The explanation offered by these three men is an attempt to 
I 
I i 
reconcile what we rlOW about nature and human nature with evil as we 
see it, avoiding <Jbgma.tic answers when they do not square with the 
I 
facts. However, pf'obably no explanation of evil is entirely sa tis-
factory. Aside fr~m the inconsistencies and contradictions alrealy 
noted, the most se~ious defect of such an explanation is its liabili~ 
to a foolish optimksm. It is in danger of being guilty of what might 
I be termed a "well-fed complacency", a complacency arising from never 
I 
experiencing,extrebe hunger, or physical pain, or moral injustice. 
•• 
• 
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It embodies the spirit of progress, of bigger and bigger and better 
and better. For these writers, the world is not nearly so bad as it 
once was, and what is more, it is getting better and better all the 
time. Evil, 1"1hile real, is gradually being eliminated. 
It is significant that these men do not r_ely upon external evi-
dence for their belief in progress because, if they were to look for 
statistics, they might have to abandon their optimism. It is well to 
note that all of their writings appeared before World War I. Perhaps 
merely to live through that war, let alone the second one, would have 
changed their tone of writing, withou,t even needing statistics. But, 
in the case of statistics, Pitirim Sorokin has done some research 
and his findings cannot be ignored. Based on his studies of the inci-
dence of war from 500 B.C. to l925 A.D., and considering each war from 
the standpoint of duration, size of armies, and casualities per mil-
lion of corresponding population, he concludes that t1The twentieth 
century will unquestionably prove to be the bloodiest and most bellig-
erent of all the twenty-five centurmes under consideration. 111 
This does not speak well of our progress tOI"rard the overcoming 
of moral evil in the form of war~ He goes on to state that 11we live 
in an age unique for the unrestrained use of brute force in inter-
national relations. 112 Sorokin would thus be quick to criticize any 
very optimistic view of progress • 
1. Pitirim A. Sorokin, The Crisis of Our Age, (New York: E.P .• Dutton 
& Co., Inc., 1946), p. 216. 
2. Ibid.' p. 217. 
~· 
\\ 
~ 
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Faced by the imminent menace of explosive revolutions, 
twentietfih-century society beguiled itself with sweet 
illusions of orderly, streamlined progress alo~g the 
smooth highway of gradual and J!.ational change. 
The increase in suicide is introduced as another symptom of 
i man 1 s failure. It has doubled and :bripled in most countries during 
the past century. 2 In the case of mental disease Sorokin notes a 
similar definite upswing. Criminality is likewise increasing, with 
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crime becoming a business, carried out with business~like efficmency. 
He has further disheartening figures in the areas of brutality of 
punishment and economic misery. 3 
On this kind of evidence progress almost disappears, and we seem 
much more to be receding, rather than advancing, in our assault against 
: evil. While such statistics do not present the whole story, they must 
. be taken into consideration by anyone trying to reconcile all the facts 
of human experience. 
Although the doctrine of a finite God and emergent evolution may 
. not be entirely satisfactory, the writer finds it more satisfactory 
·: than any of the traditional answers. This answer allows man freedom, 
' 
; and yet does not make man ultimately responsible for evil. It pre-
! serves God 1 s goodness, though at the expense of his omnipotence, and 
not only makes possible, but makes necessary, a working relationship 
between God and man. It relieves man from the terrific load of wicked-
: ness placed upon him by existentialists and the nee-orthodox movement 
; 1. Ibid.' p. 222. 
,2~ Ibid., p .. 224. 
,3~ Ibid.' p. 23l. 
I 
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in Christianity. It allows man to ris~ up to the challenge and stimu-
i 
lation of the highest being, and join forces with that being for the 
realization of a better world. If we h~d hoped for a completely sat-
1 isfactory explanation, we can be consoled by Rashdall 1 s words: 
The man who declares that he has got a theory of the 
Universe which i:Q.volves
1 
!fO difficulties is simply a 
man who does not think. : .. 
1. Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, p. 354. 
I 
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.ABSTRACT 
Evil is a phenomenon not easily accounted for. It has been ~ari-
ously ignored, denied, rationalized, and perenially endured. It pre-
sents particular difficulties for the different religions. Any theologi-
cal concept of man, the universe and God must make a satisfactory consi-
deration of this phenomenon. But how are God and evil to be reconcmled? 
Within the context of Christianity several explanations have 
developed. Some modification or combination of these views has been 
accepted by most or~hodox Christians. Among the most common of these 
explanations are: (1) evil is unreal. The Christian Scientists, along 
with some Hindus, adhere to this view that evil is an illusion, a tem-
porary mistaking. 
( 2) Evil is inc0111plete good. ..l judgment that a thing is bad 
results from a partial view of the thing. Or it is a simple lack of 
perfection, not a real thing in itself, but a lack of something. 
(3) Evil is necessary as a contrast to good. We would not know or 
i 
appreciate the good if :we had not the evil. Life would be frightfully 
dull with no contrast to add interest. 
(4) Evil is sometimes explained as being necessary for punish-
\ ment or discipline. Men deserve the evil they suffer because of some 
·wrong they are guilty ~f. Or, 'evil is necessary to challenge, reform 
or test a person. Hum.cin nature at its best emerges by being urged on 
I 
·~ by obstacles. (5) Probably the most common view is the one that evil 
\ .. /-··-
\ 
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-is the result o.f human .freedom. I.f man is to have any free will, and 
he $Ust have .freedom to be a moral being, there must be both good and 
evil for him to choose between. Otherwise man would be simply mecha-
nical, and his existence becomes meaningless, lacking purpose. 
Some writers and thinkers have found none of these explanations 
satisfactory. William James, Hastings Rashdall and L. T. Hobhouse are 
among those who have searched for a more adequate understanding of the 
presence of evil in the world. Each o.f these :men combines belief in a 
fi.nime God with a theory of emergent evolution in an attempt to deal 
realistically with the problem of evil. Although_ they develop this 
view differently, the essential solution is one of .a God li:mited in 
p'ower and thus unable to prevent evil, but able to combat evil. With 
the co-operation of :man God is working to bring about the evolution of 
a more perfect universe. _ 
A theory of a limited God is not new with these :men, but ean be 
traced as far back as the Greeks. _These men give their own interpre-
tation to the idea. According to James, human nature has a decisive 
voice in determining the tenability of a philosophy. He gives first 
place not to the truth of a philosophyJ; but to the conditions in us of 
its acceptability. This is -the basis of his belief in a -limited God • 
.An omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent God -would violate man•s free 
will, and to deny free will makes nonsense of human nature as we know 
it. Even more important, such a deity would be personally responsible 
for all of the evil in the world. :And a God with greater goodness than 
man could not be responsible for the evil iri the world as we know it. 
To those who object that God could not be finite, James asserts that a 
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God worthy of the name must be finite. 
James sees this limit in the nsuperhu.man consciousnessn as arising 
from an e~ternal environment which provides conditions with which God 
must cope. Such a God, then, is not completely lacking in power, but 
is rather the deepest power in the universe. According to James 1 s 
famous analogy of the chess players, God is the ex,Pert player who knows 
all the possible moves of the novice, although he cannot foresee exactly 
· what any move of his adve,rsary will be. Despite this, he knows in ad-
vance how tb meet each move by one of hi;§ own that leads in the direc-
tion he wishes. Such a view preserves God t s power and goodness" as well 
as our free will. 
.. 
The purpose of the universe will only be realized i.f each member 
co-operates. It is the common struggle of man and God that gives mean-
ing to the sweat and blood of this life. .Evolution operates here to 
provide elements of challenge. For James the ultimate salvation is 
probabl~ but not certain. He assumes the melioristic position, midway 
between the pessimist Who copsiders salvation impossible, and the opti-
~ 
mist who considers it inevitable. He declares that the world can be 
made better. So the destiny of man is to assert himself by actively 
imposing his ideals, thereby contributing to God's work for perfection. 
Hastings Rashdall derives the ground for belief in the existence 
of God from his concept of morality. The ethical judgments at which 
man arrives then point to a higher morality •. On this basis evil is 
accepted as existing because it is a necessary means to the greatest 
good that the nature of things makes possible. Limitations are opera-
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ting here, and tl:ese limitations are part of the ultimate nature o:f 
things, which means God. Rashdall makes it clear, however, that God 
is not limited by anything outside His own nature. .And God ppssesses 
all the power there is; he can do all things that are in their own 
nature possible. 
Despite any limitation l'Vhich might be ascribed to God, He must 
still be regarded as working out a plan which is essentially good for 
His creatures and Himself. Such a view appeals to a concept of mora-
lity that consists in striving. It is a project in which the CO?opera-
tion of man is essential, a real struggle in which we have the ultimate 
power of the universe on our side. 
Rashdallts theory is determinist .~t~~~it affirms an eventual 
triumph o:f good. God causes bad souls to appear as a means to an ulti-
mate good, a good unattainable 'Without them. Evil is here explained 
in terms of the union in one and the same being of absolute goodness 
with limited power. God is responsible :for evil that men do, but not 
in such a way as to relieve man from a:ny responsibility, because man 
alone wills evil otherwise than as a means to the good. God is con-
stantly active working for the attainment of the ends which he knows 
to be essentially best. 
L. T. Hobhouse is forced to adopt a belief in a limited God be-
cause of the free will of men. Even if all evil resulted from wicked 
men it is God who made them free to commit this folly. To suggest that 
God could not, without introducing suffering, produce the highest form of' 
man, is to introduce a further limitation, this time on Godts creative 
power. 
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So Ho't:ll\Q'IlB: OQlleli:d:f'e& of a. Spirlt ox- lind, Sttbj•et tn conditions 
and ·aohi~ i.ts :full ;rowth o.nl3 'b7 astering them~ '.rbe utent of 
«til 141 t.h6 me-aau~ o:r tba ine'QlBPletenees ot the ord«t:r aotnall.J' a.ohieved; 
. b7 Kind in th& wo~ld,o: H• $peaks ot a aelt.-..oQmroioWJ. evolation of ~· 
:i:ty) l:ul'Ving a pu:rpos~ towaX*da: nioh 1t $i'A&d.i'.l-1' ~ its 'WtlY'i !hiJ ~· 
luti® <>f llind ie th$ d.Qmina.ting p~ino:tpls, of tbia 1fro1'1d.~, 'thia MUd is 
nett simply a celleation of hlnlau ai:nd&t.~ 'b\tt an Q'ft~ f~••~ aet.i:veJ~ 
effeoting a highe~ mi'der~ 
Plf'Ogreftat is .nnt simple s.nd au~ti., s bnt iS -.d~ rather ~ in 
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